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Profile of the Modern Smokejumper; A Tension-Centered Lens on Identity and 
Identification 
Chairperson: Gregory S. Larson 
How organizational members manage the daily tensions they face can have significant 
positive or negative consequences for themselves and the organizations they work for, 
especially when those contradictions are experienced as part of an organizational identity. 
Organizational identities are shown in this research study to be especially potent forms of 
organizational tension which must be managed discursively on a daily basis in order to 
maintain a sense of solidarity in what it means to be an organizational member. After 
interviewing members of the Missoula Smokejumper Base, this study highlights two 
significant identity tensions that go into what it means to be a smokejumper and describes 
in detail two discursive management techniques participants used to manage them in 
daily practice. It also explores the ways in which identity tension can challenge and 
reinforce organizational identity, while offering a sobering look into how specific 
discursive management techniques frame tension in practice. 
This study offers several theoretical implications pertinent to the field of organizational 
communication as well as several practical implications for the smokejumper 
organization and wildland fire community. Among other things, this study reinforces 
previous theories that promote collaborative and situation based tension management 
models as productive ways of dealing with unavoidable tension. It also makes several 
unique theoretical contributions dealing with decision making and the impact of 
discursive management techniques on identity. This study also includes several practical 
implications that reexamine the efficacy of creating a "safe" identity as part of what it 
means to be a professional firefighter, as well as recommendations that impact current 
dialogue within the wildland firefighting community dealing with crew cohesion. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE, RE\ lEW OF 
RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Introduction 
On July 6. 1994 a fire blowup at the foot of Storm King Mountain. Colorado 
overtook and killed 14 elite wildland firefighters (J. N. Maclean, 1999). Three of these 
'elites' came from the ranks of the smokejumper organization (J. N. Maclean), hit hard 
by a similar disaster near Helena, Montana in 1949. This study targets the unique tension 
between organizationally mandated safety rules and aggressive firefighting norms in 
order to better understand how organizational members make sense of themselves amid 
the unavoidable contradictions that make up their daily work lives. 
In response to what is now known as the South Canyon fire, smokejumpers along 
with other wildland firefighters were condemned for an over-aggressive "can do" attitude 
(TriData, 1998; Weick, 1995). However, follow up accounts and critiques of the South 
Canyon fire suggest that at the heart of the 1994 disaster lay a unique organizational 
tension mandating two seemingly contradictory edicts listed as the first of ten standard 
fire orders all wildland firefighters were expected to obey; "fight fires aggressively but 
provide for safety first" (J. N. Maclean, 1999, p. 237; Appendix A). Even a casual 
reading of the first standard fire order suggests somewhat of a paradox in being able to 
simultaneously "provide for safety first " while also fighting fire "aggressively." A closer 
reading provokes even more suspicion of mandated organizational tension. While the Ten 
Standard Orders were originally implemented as a means of improving safety in 1957 
(Cook. 2004), firefighters inten. iew ed after South Canyon admitted that "strict adherence 
to the standard orders and guidelines would mean letting many, perhaps most, fires bum 
unchecked" (J. N. Maclean, p. 237). This suggests the unique challenge smokejumpers 
and other wildland firefighters may face in balancing the needs for safety with the needs 
to aggressively get the job done. 
However, despite the challenge of this dilemma, smokejumpers, like the rest of 
the wildland fire community, still seem to get their job done year after year. Notably, the 
smokejumper organization has maintained a relatively strong safetv record \\ ith only two 
major fire disasters in the course of a 60-plus year history. This suggests that they may 
already have reliably productive wa\ s of managing this tension in practice. 
Rationale 
Organizational tensions have traditionally been framed as problems that should be 
eliminated to preserve organizational harmony rather than ever-present structural 
qualities of organizations and what it means to organize (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a; 
Weick, 1969). However, "...foregrounding tension can lead to richer understandings of 
actual practice and thereby aid in theory building" (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a, p. 82). 
Additionally, recent scholarship suggests that it is not whether organizational tensions 
exist but how they are managed that spells the difference between individual and 
organizational well being and distress (Tracy, 2004). Ashcraft & Trethewey (2004a) as a 
result argue for a tension-centered perspective on organizational research as a productive 
w av of reframing traditional \ iew s on organizational tension. They encourage 
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organizational communication scholars to begin \\ ith the assumption that tensions are a 
natural and unavoidable part of organizational life. This highlights the management 
techniques members use to respond and '\..lire \\ iih tension..." as important concerns 
directly connected to applied theory (Ashcraft & Trethe\\ ey. 2004a. p. 84). 
Scott, Corman. and Cheney (1998) position organizational identification as a 
communicative process that creates, maintains, and alters the structures of rules and 
resources" which constitute individual identity (p. 303). Organizational scholars 
recognize the contradicted and competing nature of organizational identification (Larson 
& Pepper, 2003; Scott et al., 1998). While some scholars have clearly outlined how 
organizational members manage conflicting identities in practice (Larson & Pepper, 
2003), they recognize that current theory is lacking in studies that target the consequences 
of identity management techniques (Kuhn & Nelson, 2002; Larson & Pepper). 
In this study I will use the tension-centered perspective as a lens by which to 
study organizational identification and identity. A tension-centered perspective can help 
researchers better understand organizational identification and identity by highlighting 
how members experience core identity tensions in the course of day to day work life and 
how they communicatively manage those tensions in practice. As an applied framework, 
the tension-centered perspective is well equipped to engage not only how organizational 
members manage unavoidable identity tensions but also . the relationship between the 
management of multiple identifications and particular outcomes" (Larson & Pepper. 
2003). 
In light of a tension-centered perspective on identity and identification, the 
smokejumper organization is a productive group to look at for several reasons. First, as 
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described in the introduction, smokejumpers are intimately tied up in tension as part of 
their daily work lives. They are required to be ''safe" firefighters as well as "aggressi\ e"" 
firefighters. Second, as previously discussed, the smokejumper organization boasts a 60-
plus year history of fighting wildland fire with only two major disasters. This suggests 
they may already have productive identity management techniques in place \\ hich allow 
them to reduce the tension between opposing identities. Third, this study fills an 
important gap by targeting a much neglected, but significant research group. It's 
significant that despite their involvement in two of the largest wildland tlretlghting 
tragedies (Mann Gulch & Storm King Mountain), this group has been \ irtually neglected 
in terms of academic research (for exceptions see TriData, 1996; Driessen. 2002). As a 
result, while they may have productive management techniques that can contribute to 
what we know about organizations, previous scholars have not tapped this potential 
strength. 
More specifically, smokejumpers at the Missoula base are a unique and fruitful 
group to study for several reasons. First, smokejumping began only 35 miles from the 
Missoula base at the Seeley Lakes Ranger Station in 1939, suggesting that this particular 
base has a long tradition in the trade (J. N. Maclean, 1999). Such deep rooted traditions 
influence how members manage their identity as smokejumpers in terms of the tension 
between safety and aggression. Additionally, having the Missoula base in close proximity 
to the University of Montana (Missoula Smokejumpers. 2004) makes this a convenient 
location for research. 
Second, the Missoula base participated in the South Canyon fire which has been 
heralded as one of the two most influential disasters in wildland firefighting history (J. N. 
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Maclean. 1999). As a result, the emphasis the U.S. Forest Service has placed on safety in 
the wake of the disaster may have special meaning to this group. Understanding how 
current identity issues impact how this group functions within the larger parent 
organization of the U.S. Forest Service is important especially within a culture of 
'safety'' (Safe Fire Concepts and Forest Stewardship Concepts. 2004). 
This study is well positioned to comment on several areas of practical concern to 
the smokejumper organization. First, this study can offer a unique window looking at 
potential ways in which entrenched structures of identity impact practical issues like 
safety. Second, this study is also w ell positioned to comment on the status of safety 
recommendations made by investigators following South Canyon in 1994 (TriData, 
1998), especially as those recommendations concern issues of identity and culture. Third, 
this study may also be useful as a means of seeing whether smokejumpers themselves 
agree with how they are described by outside researchers as "can do" firefighters 
(TriData, 1996) who lack "crew cohesion"" (Driessen, 2002, p. 14). Fourth, this study is 
obligated as an applied study to evaluate the effectiveness and offer practical implications 
for the discursive management techniques smokejumpers use in order to negotiate the 
identity tensions they work with on a daily basis. 
Having established a rationale for this study, in Chapter One I will present the 
relevant literature related to organizational tension, organizational identity and 
identification. After presenting the relevant literature, 1 will summarize the chapter and 
present the research questions guiding this study. In Chapter Two I will discuss my 
method for conducting this research, giving a brief history of the smokejumper 
organization, a discussion of the chronological progression of the ten standard fire orders. 
participant demographics, and the specific procedural and theoretical methods 1 used to 
go about this study. In Chapter Three I will discuss my results, answering each of the 
three research questions introduced at the end of Chapter One. In Chapter Four 1 \\ ill 
discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this study to the field of 
communication studies as well as to the smokejumper organization and wildland fire 
Review of Relevant Literature 
Organizational Research: A Tension-Centered Perspective 
Organizational tensions between conflicting values and expectations have always 
been a significant part of organizational life. While they have traditionally been framed as 
anomalies to be removed from otherwise healthy organizations (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 
2004a), some scholars suggest significant consequences connected with managing and 
mis-managing organizational tensions. For example, through Tracy's (2004) study of 
prison guards, she found that when tensions are framed as ''complementary dialectics" 
that must be managed it "is associated \\ ith positi\ e organizational outcomes as well as 
with emotional well being" (p. 143). On the other hand, framing tensions as 
contradictions and especially double-binds are ''associated with debilitating emotional 
reactions including paralysis, literalism, withdrawal, and paranoia" (p. 143) and can be 
especially destructive for individuals and organizations. Likewise Stohl and Cheney 
(2001) argue that some paradoxes and tensions are more debilitating than others, 
suggesting that even good techniques may not adequately respond to more devastating 
binds. 
Thankfully, scholarly interest in addressing the challenges of organizational 
dilemmas and tensions has increased throughout the field of communication studies over 
the last ten years (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a). Ashcraft and Trethewey (2004a) 
suggest that some of this interest may be due to the much more complex environment the 
modem organizational member is required to navigate. More recently, a lively interest in 
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how organizational members "...experience the variety of organizational tensions that 
have been theorized as part of their everyday li\es" (Ashcraft & Trethcwey. 2004a. p. 82) 
has led to new and innovative frameworks from which to look at organizations and 
respond to growing needs in applied ways. 
For example, rather than framing tensions as problematic glitches. Ashcraft and 
Trethewey (2004a) argue that they "are routine features of organizational life that attest 
to the fundamental irrationality of organizing" (p. 83). As a result, they have argued for 
organizational scholarship to begin with a "tension-centered approach" (p. 82) to 
organizational study that assumes from the start of research the unavoidable existence of 
tension as a fundamental part of what constitutes organizational life. As a result of this 
scholarship, a fundamental assumption has begun to shift; tension is no longer framed as 
the culprit of organizational distress. Tensions are neutral. They exist as a critical part of 
what makes people organize (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a: Weick, 1969). Rather than 
blaming unavoidable tensions, a tension-centered approach argues that more scholarly 
effort needs to be placed in first identifying how organizational members manage the 
tensions of daily life and also, framing the study of tension as an applied concern, 
evaluating the productive and destructive consequences of various management 
techniques. 
Readjusting the weight of responsibility onto members rather than the tensions 
themselves not only reframes how we look at tensions, but also empowers individuals 
with the ability to change or maintain the status quo. Organizational members are active 
agents who largely determine how everyday challenges will play out in their own lives by 
the choices they make. While organizational tensions have the potential to slow or hurt 
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workers - they don t have to. It s still true that some tensions can be more difficult to 
navigate than others for both organizations and members, but it is how members and 
organizations choose to manage the unavoidable tensions found in their everyday \\ ork 
practice that makes the real difference between positive and negative outcomes. 
Recent research to date has emphasized how organizational members manage 
implicit personal values with organizationally mandated behavior (Tracy, 2004), 
conflicting ideals associated with masculinity and agricultural cooperatives (Harter, 
2004), competing expectations for female managers (Martin, 2004), and how employees 
manage the tensions between multiple identities (Larson & Pepper. 2003). However, even 
with recent interest in tension management we are still just breaking the surface in 
tension-centered organizational research. More scholarship is needed to uncover the 
tensions common to organizational members generally and those specific to their unique 
fields of occupation (Ashcraft & Trethewey. 2004a). Such needs should move 
organizational communication scholarship to continue integrating other communicative 
emphases of research in an effort to further uncover how these unavoidable tensions play 
out in daily life. 
Identity and Identification in Organizations 
Scott et al. 's (1998) structurational model of organizational identification provides 
a helpful framework by which to view the relationship between identity, identification 
and organizational tension from a communication perspective. They see identification as 
the communicative process by which individuals create, maintain, and reshape their 
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individual identities. Drawing from the work of Czamiawska-Joerges (1994). they 
provide a working definition of identity as the "core beliefs or assumptions, \ alues. 
attitudes, preferences, decisional premises, gestures, habits, rules, and so on...[that]... 
ideally speaking, provide us with relatively stable characteristics that make up the self" 
(p. 303). They argue that identities are constructs of "rules and resources'" (p. 303) 
members use in order to navigate organizational life and make sense of themselves. 
However, they make a clear distinction between constructs of identity and how members 
choose to express those identities in terms of communicatix e actions (identification). 
They discuss three primary aspects of a structurational model of identification as it 
impacts identity and identification research: identification as a process and a product, 
multiple identities, and situational context. 
Identification as a Process and a Product 
Using a structuration approach to identification, Scott et al. (1998) express 
identities in terms of relatively stable constructs while identifications refer to the ways in 
which members use discourse and communicative actions to enact the principles and 
values that make up their identities. In other words identification describes both a process 
and a product (identity). For example "I am a father because I act in fatherly ways, and 
my fatherly ways make sense because I am a father" (Scott et al., p. 307). More 
importantly, the father that acts in fatherly ways is shaped in their identity as a father by 
those actions. Identification provides members with a framework by which they can 
make sense of themselves and the world around them (Larson & Pepper. 2003). 
Therefore, as noted by Larson and Pepper, identity is the structure (i.e.. values, rules, etc.) 
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and identification deals with the communicative choices of assumed identity made by 
free agents. 
While identity is typically recognized for its ability to stabilize our sense of 
meaning, the simultaneous influence of identity on identification and identification on 
identity bind organizational members in a reciprocal cycle where identity influence 
identification and identification influences identity. As a result individuals cannot express 
their identity without impacting the structure of who they are. Ironically, while identity is 
recognized as a stabilizing agent, this tension stemming from identity and identification 
simultaneously creates instability. In effect it places indi\ idual and organizational 
identity in a communicative environment of continual management and flux ''where 
organizational members struggle for the primacy of various meanings of truth and 
identity, as well as their material manifestations" (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a, p. 83). 
In such a situation of continual contestation and change over the meanings of 
organizational identities the opportunity for clashing values and premises of action 
increases, complicating what it means to be an organizational member. 
This obvious tension between the characteristics of stability and change may be 
understood by an analogy to driving a car. When driving a car we are able to maintain a 
relatively straight course by making constant and somewhat unconscious adjustments to 
the steering wheel. Similarly, while making constant minor adjustments to our sense of 
self we may be able to maintain a sense of stability in terms of an identity that continues 
to make sense within the context of a continuously changing environment. Rarely do we 
pay attention to the minor adjustments made to the steering wheel when driving a car. 
This suggests that how we maintain identity may be relatively unconscious. We 
just /ee/ stable as the familiar methodical actions of daily management fade into the 
background. Additionally, the relationship between identity and identification suggests 
that changes, while constant, are fairly minor for the most part. True enough, there may 
be rare moments when a significant deviation from course is necessary in order to 
maintain stability, bringing our consciousness of the otherwise unnoticeable 'steering 
wheel" adjustments to the forefront in terms of identity management, but for the most part 
it makes sense that identity adjustments are relatively small changes we rarely notice. 
Multiple Identities 
Further complicating our understanding of how identity plays out in practice, this 
model also acknowledges how individuals are naturally fragmented beings that embody 
multiple identities as a result of multiple societal relationships (i.e.. father, brother, son, 
etc.) and multiple organizational memberships (i.e.. manager, committee member, 
employee, etc.). Such identities and their communicative expression via identification are 
plural, coexist and group together, often conflict and therefore must be negotiated in 
productive ways (Scott et al., 1998). To illustrate how such identities conflict, Scott et al. 
give an example of a university instructor who identifies with his role as a husband, 
father, university employee, departmental faculty member, citizen, and member of a 
larger academic discipline. As a result, the possibility for incongruent and competing 
values and beliefs is much more likely. When that professor is placed in a situation where 
such values contradict, as when he discovers his daughter is attending one of his classes 
(a good university employee avoids nepotism; yet a good father feels special affinity with 
his children), the obvious tensions and contradictions become more apparent. 
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In light of the previous reciprocal relationship between identity and 
identifications, it's also interesting to recognize that choosing to enact a specific identity 
may also impact the structure of other identities in complex ways since many of the 
values and premises that constitute one identity are shared by other identity constructs. 
As a result, the complexity of how identities and identifications are continuously 
managed in light of organizational tension increases dramatically. Additionally, applied 
research that investigates how such complexities are managed in actual practice becomes 
even more relevant (Ashcraft & Trethewey. 2004a). 
Several scholars have investigated how organizational members manage identity 
in actual practice. For example. Larson and Pepper (2003) found that members appealed 
to three primary discursive strategies when justifying their choices between multiple, 
competing identities: comparison, logic, and support. Comparison involved a variety of 
individual techniques that sought to justify their decision in terms of what the other 
available options were and made the claim that theirs was the best choice. Logic involved 
"rational justifications for their identification choices" based on evidence a particular 
group accepts as credible (p. 544) and support was identified "when the speaker [drew] 
on others to justify his or her identification" (p. 547). In this way, members were able to 
navigate difficult tensions and contradictions they faced when placed in an uncertain 
environment. 
However, other research indicates that identities appear to be difficult to change 
once they have been firmly established. Bullis and Tompkins (1989) argued that when 
organizafions abandon key values, members will stay loyal to the values rather than to the 
organization. Additionally, Larson and Tompkins (2005) argue that managers often 
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participate in subtle forms of resistance through ambiguity when the organization 
changes values and principles upon which they have become identified. More open 
resistance to traditional identity roles has led to entrenched power inequities within 
organizations (Collinson. 1994) and society (Knights & Willmott, 1985). 
Situational Context 
Lastly, Scott et al.'s (1998) structurational model of identification argues that 
identities and identifications are often managed according to the context of the situation. 
For example, the illustrative professor who is caught in a dilemma of loyalty to the 
university through his role as a good instructor (who avoids nepotism) and loyalty to his 
daughter (who has claim upon his special attention since he is a good father) may likely 
resolve the conflict in terms of his role as instructor because he is at school surrounded by 
contexts that strongly reinforce that role. This isn't to say that he abandons his special 
affinity for his daughter, but what it does mean is that the balance between the two 
competing identities sways in favor of his contextualized self. As a result, the context of 
the situation has the potential to dramatically impact how members manage identity 
tensions in actual practice. 
This study is especially well-suited for investigating the ways in which 
smokejumpers handle identity tensions since such tensions involved in organizational 
constructions of identity are theoretically more potent when individuals are surrounded 
by the contexts that reinforce them. Since the tension between aggressively fighting fire 
and obligations to safety are tied to how smokejumpers make sense of themselves (e.g.. 
the identity construct of "smokejumper"), it s reasonable that they would have to face and 
manage this tension more directly in actual practice where their environment reinforces 
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that particular identity. As argued in the rationale, smokejumpers offer a unique context 
in which to study organizational tension. Using interviews as a means of contextualizing 
the decisions they make will allow this study to more accurately assess how they manage 
unavoidable organizational tension. 
Framing Organizational Tensions as Identity Tensions 
The literature on tension-centered research (Ashcraft & Trethewey. 2004a; 2004b) 
and the structurational model of identification (Scott et al., 1998) suggests that 
organizational tensions can be producti\ cly framed as identity tensions. Looking at them 
as identity tensions is productive because it recognizes that at the heart of daily tensions 
organizational members experience are core values and beliefs that structure 
organizational and individual identity. These values often exist in tension within 
organizations as a direct result of contradicting and competing sources of identification. 
For example, organizational members may identify strongly with the individual members 
of their department while also identifying strongly with their parent organization. 
Framing organizational tension as issues of identity intensifies how these tensions 
play out during daily organizational life. For example a close reading of the tension 
between safety and aggression that smokejumpers face in the context of identity suggests 
that these values are not merely actions smokejumpers engage in but rather core identities 
that make up what it means to them to be smokejumpers. By framing these tensions as 
identity tensions, we should expect to see that the contradictions are much more 
entrenched, difficult to a\ oid, and more lethal to individual decision making and 
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organizational well-being if managed in negative ways. This increases the urgency of not 
only identifying how organizational members deal with tension, but of evaluating the 
enabling power of "particular outcomes" (Larson & Pepper. 2003). 
Additionally, framing organizational tension as ideniity tensions also allows us to 
tap into grounded and proven theories that can productively enhance and improve our 
understanding of how far reaching organizational tensions are in daily practice. Identity 
tensions effectively complicate how we look at decision making by adding one more 
nuance to the mix. Looking at identity and identification from a tension-centered 
perspective suggests that, like organizations themselves, individuals are made up of 
unavoidable and contradicting identities. Rather than looking for ways to eradicate 
opposing identities and identifications in pursuit of greater individual and organizational 
health, framing unavoidable tensions as identity tensions suggests that organizational and 
individual health can more successfully be ensured by discovering and promoting 
productive management techniques. 
Summary of Review of Relevant Literature 
This section has reviewed relevant literature dealing with organizational tensions 
and organizational identification and identity. While organizational tensions are 
traditionally seen as problematic glitches in otherwise healthy organizations, a tension-
centered approach suggests that it is not tension themselves, but rather how tensions are 
managed ihixX more accurately predicts organizational and individual w ell being and 
distress (Ashcraft & Trethcwey, 2004a). Literature dealing with identity and 
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identification (Scott et al., 1998) highlights the role of discourse in the ongoing process of 
creating, maintaining, and changing structures of identity. Current research highlights the 
need to not only report how organizational members manage the identity tensions they 
experience as part of organizational life, but more specifically the ways in which 
particular management techniques bring about "particular outcomes" in the lix es of those 
who employ them (Larson & Pepper, 2003). As a result framing organizational tensions 
as issues of identity has productive consequences by reinforcing the daily una\ oidable 
tensions members feel in terms of entrenched, core \ alues. This suggests that from a 
tension-centered perspective, identity tensions would be much more difficult to avoid 
because they connect so deeply with how organizational members make sense of w ho 
they are. Looking at organizational tension as identity issues also emphasizes the 
importance of identifying management techniques which promote individual and 
organizational well being. With management techniques as a focus, 1 will use the 
following three research questions to guide this study; 
RQl: What are the primary identity tensions smokejumpers must manage? 
RQ2: How do smokejumpers discursively manage identity tensions in daily 
practice? 
RQ3: How does the tension between fighting fire aggressively and providing for 
safety first: a) challenge and/or reinforce smokejumper identity, and b) get 
reshaped by smokejumper identity in actual practice? 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 
In the first section, I gave the rationale for doing this proposed stud\ and 
reviewed the related literature. 1 then presented the three research questions used to guide 
this study. 1 will now address the methods I used to conduct this study by giving a brief 
background of the field, describing the participants, discussing the method of inquiry and 
instruments I used to gather my data, and by presenting how 1 went about gathering and 
analyzing that information to produce the final results and discussion. 
Background of the Field 
In order to understand the field of smokejumping, it is important to understand the 
main events that shaped the smokcjumper organization during the last 60+ years. To 
accomplish this, I will first give a brief history of smokejumping in the United States. 
This history will cover the birth and major events that shaped what smokejumping is 
today. Following this, I will present an overview of the history and development of the 
Ten Standard Fire Orders which play an important role in smokejumper identity by 
providing bureaucratic support of the safety-aggression identity tension jumpers must 
manage on a daily basis. 
A Brief History of Smokejumping in the U.S. 
Talk of dropping firefighters from airplanes onto remote w ildland fires began as 
early as the 1930"s. Most historical sources dealing w ith the early years of smokejumping 
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indicate that the idea of dropping firefighters on fires w as generally rejected "as being too 
dangerous and impractical " (First Parachute Years. 2004). As a result, U.S. Forest 
Service officials worked from 1936-1939 to develop other ways of managing fire from 
the air, including ''water and chemical bombs" (First Parachute Years). However, while 
these efforts helped the newly established Aerial Fire Control Experimental Project to 
improve cargo dropping techniques, they did little to actually contain remote wildland 
fires. 
hi 1939, David P Godwin, Assistant Chief of Fire Control in Washington, D.C. 
recommended that funds from the water and chemical bombing tests should be 
transferred to a new parachute jumping experiment. Successful experiments were 
conducted in the area of Winthrop, Washington from October 5"^ through November 15''\ 
1939 (First Parachute Years. 2004) where Walt Anderson gave them a name. He called 
this new band of remote wildland firefighters "smokejumpers" (First Parachute Years; 
National Smokejumper Association & Smith, 2000). 
After experiments proved successful in 1939. a call went out for young men 
interested in being a part of this new group. From the ranks of 100 applicants with little 
or no fire fighting experience, seven were selected to take part in the first firefighting 
drops in the United States; Jim Alexander, Jim Waite, Rufus Robinson, Earl Cooley, Bill 
Bolen. Dick Lynch, and Chet Derry. Stationed out of the Seeley Lake Ranger Station, 35 
miles northeast of Missoula, Montana, the crew began an intense physical fitness training 
program consisting of ten training jumps (Early Missoula Years, 2004). The training was 
so rigorous that all but two of the original crew were injured during practice jumps and 
could not finish. In 1940, Rufus Robinson and Earl Cooley became the first 
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smokejumpers to jump an actual fire (Early Missoula Years). 
The history of smokejumping in the U.S. is not without its tragedies. Just nine 
years following the first jump smokejumpers sustained their first major disaster. After 
fire jumped a ravine in Mann Gulch near Helena. Montana in the summer of 1949, 15 
smokejumpers and one forest ranger raced for their lives in a desperate attempt to outrun 
a 60 mile per hour wall of flame (N. Maclean, 1 993). Twelve jumpers w ere burned over 
by fire that day. making it the largest single loss of smokejumpers in history. 
The disaster seemed to shake the foundations of wildland firefighting, creating no 
small debate between victims' families and U.S. Forest Service personnel (N. Maclean. 
1993). Ironically, the disaster became a marking point for a period of relative safety and 
growth for the smokejumper organization. The National Smokejumper Association 
reports that the next 45 years brought only a few accidental deaths due to parachute 
malfunction and/or landing accidents, a period of peace that ended on the slopes of Storm 
King Mountain, Colorado in 1994 (National Smokejumper Association & Smith, 2000). 
When the South Canyon Fire hit Colorado on Storm King Mountain, jumpers 
came from a number of bases including Missoula (J. N. Maclean, 1999). The first man 
out the door was Don Mackey, making him '"jumper — in — charge," a title indicating it 
was his duty to lead the other Missoula jumpers during the fire. Around four o'clock in 
the afternoon on July 26, 1994, jumpers were working alongside hotshots, BLM crew 
members, and district crews, digging line downhill with chainsaws and pulaskis when the 
fire blew up (J. N. Maclean). Later investigations showed that the physical terrain was 
similar to the Mann Gulch fire of 1949 and a similar historic tragedy follow ed. While 
racing up the severe incline of the slope, fourteen wildland firefighters lost their lives. 
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Three of those killed were smokejumpers, including Don Mackey from the Missoula 
Base. 
In the aftermath of the 1994 disaster, the U.S. Forest Service commissioned 
TriData Corporation to conduct a massive nation-wide study of wildland firefighters. 
Using data collected from interviews and surveys involving o\ er 1000 participants from 
virtually all fire fighting occupations within the wildland fire (TriData. 1996) community, 
they made several recommendations to improve safety. In the report that followed, often 
referred to as the TriData study, the traditional "can do " attitude of w ildland firefighters 
generally and smokejumpers specifically was targeted as a major cause of the disaster 
(TriData). Since the fire of 1994 in Colorado, while tragedies have hit other areas of the 
wildland fire community, smokejumpers have enjoyed a period of relative safety, change, 
and growth. 
History and Development of the Ten Standard Fire Orders 
According to Cook (2004), the Ten Standard Fire Orders were one of three formal 
safety contributions stemming from the Report of the Task Force to Recommend Action 
to Reduce the Chances of Men Being Killed by Burning While Fighting Fire, J 95 7 (see 
Appendix E) following the Mann Gulch Fire of 1949. The ten rules "were incorporated 
into firefighter training" (National Interagency Fire Center, 2004) and provided the basis 
for the subsequent "18 Situations That Shout Watch Out" which were "more specific and 
cautionary than the Standard Fire Orders and described situations that expand the 10 
points of the Fire Orders" (National Interagency Fire Center). 
In a recent paper presented at the 2005 Human Factors Conference in Missoula, 
Montana, Thackaberry (2005) describes the early rules as an industry response to the 
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increasing fatalities resulting from wildland fire up to that point. She argues that the 
wildland firefighter community relied heavily on personal narrati\ es, highlighting the 
character traits of individuals as a means of creating a safer work environment rather than 
the performance of minute duties. For example, she describes one situation where one 
firefighter, responding successfully to a dangerous situation, was set up as the prototype 
of what other wildland firefighters should become. Over the subsequent years, the early 
rules that had formerly embraced an ethic targeting indi\ idual character as the primary 
element influencing decision-making on fires, moved to a militai'y, rules-based "ethic of 
duty" (Thackaberry, p. 4). This duty ethic assumed that "...a list of rules could harness 
individual loyalty to the group as a way to correct defects in individual thinking"" 
(Thackaberry, p. 4). 
By the time South Canyon hit the fire community in 1994, the orders had 
undergone another evolution (see Appendix A), moving even ftirther away from a focus 
on character traits (albeit rigid, rule-based ones). The shift in wording from the use of 
nouns such as "fire weather" and "communication" to " Fight." "Initiate," "Recognize," 
"Ensure," etc., shows that the industry favored specific actions or duties as the primary 
element influencing safety (Thackaberry, 2005). It was during this shift in the Standard 
Orders that the tension between safety and aggression became structured within the 
written dogma of the field in the first order "Fight fire aggressively, but provide for safety 
first" (Appendix A). 
Following the tragedy at South Canyon in 1994. TriData recommended that the 
orders be revised and shortened (TriData, 1996). However, it wasn't until a veteran from 
the field pushed through an initiative to change the orders in 2002 that they were formally 
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altered from the 1994 version (Thackaberry, 2005). An mteresting critique of the new est 
version (see Appendix B) is that they resemble "...more of a PowerPoint slide then a 
memory mnemonic" (Thackaberry, p. 6). 
The 2002 version of the Ten Standard Orders contains several important revisions 
that are worth mentioning. First, while the 1994 orders came in a laundry list fashion (i.e., 
1,2,3, 4, etc.) without any grouping, the newer version categorizes the rules under four 
primary headings (e.g., Fire Behavior, Fireline Safety, Organizational Control. If 1-9 are 
considered, then...). While this may aid in remembering all ten of the orders, it creates a 
much more visual image than previous versions (Thackaberry, 2005). 
Additionally, the 1994 version of the Orders places "fight fire aggressn ely but 
provide for safety first" (see Appendix A) as the first point on the list. In the current 
version this mandate is tenth on the list, has been rephrased as "Fight fire aggressively, 
having provided for safety first," and is preceded by the qualifier "If 1-9 are considered, 
then..." (see Appendix B). Moving this order from first to last and preceding it with a 
strict qualifier may suggest that the organization places a higher emphasis on rule-
keeping than on trusting firefighters to "provide for safety first" under their own 
guidelines. This view is supported by the statement following the tenth point which 
emphasizes that the "10 Standard Fire Orders are firm. We Don't Break Them; We Don't 
Bend Them. All firefighters have a Right to a Safe Assignment." This suggests an even 
greater emphasis on rules as the primary qualifier of what constitutes being "safe." 
Placing this at the bottom and contingent upon the adherence to each of the other nine 
guidelines may also indicate a more negati\ e organizational view of "aggressively" 
fighting wildland fires, since aggression is only to be used once everything else has been 
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satisfied. 
As mentioned, it is also interesting that the actual wording of this mandate 
describing the conflict between safety and aggression is changed in the 2002 version. The 
1994 version states that firefighters are to "fight fire aggressively but provide for safety 
first" (italics mine. Appendix A) while the 2002 version states they should "fight fire 
aggressively, having provided for safety first" (italics mine. Appendix B). Rephrasing 
this has significant meaning because it openly prioritizes safety as a qualifier for 
aggressively fighting fire. To "fight aggressively but provide for safety" suggests that 
safety may be more of an afterthought such as in the example "drive to the store, but 
don't forget your seatbelt." It in no way openly suggests how wildland firefighters should 
approach the tension. However, to use the word "having" between the two ideals suggests 
that firefighters are only to fight fire aggressively after having first provided for safety. 
As a result, safety may be seen as the gatekeeper, determines whether firefighters are 
licensed to fight fires aggressively in a given situation. 
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Participants 
National Smokejumper Organization 
Smokejumpers are an elite and professional organization within the wildland 
fireflghting community. As a national organization, they are split up into five regions 
consisting of nine bases that employ roughly 270 smokejumpers (Fire and Aviation 
Management, 2004a). Two of the bases (New Mexico and Alaska) are managed under the 
direction of the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) w hile the vast majority of 
smokejumpers in the U.S. fall under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Fire and Aviation Management (Fire & Aviation 
Management, 2004a). 
Becoming a smokejumper is no easy task. Jumper candidates must have a history 
of fire experience in wildland firefighting ''and be skilled in using the tools of the trade" 
(Fire & Aviation Management, 2004b) which include, among other tools, chainsaws and 
pulaskis (a unique tool made specifically for wildland firefighting that combines a shovel 
with an ax blade welded to the side and used for chopping through trees and brush (N. 
Maclean, 1993; J. N. Maclean, 1999)). They must also be in excellent physical condition, 
"possess a high degree of emotional stability and mental alertness," and meet specific 
height, weight, and other health-related requirements (Fire & Aviation Management, 
2004b). 
Missoula Base Smokejumpers 
The Missoula Smokejumpers are one of the oldest smokejumping organizations in 
the nation. In fact, "the airplane used on the first fire jump ever. July 10, 1940. took off 
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from Missoula" (J. N. Maclean, 1999, p. 46). The Missoula Smokejumper Base is located 
at the Aerial Fire Depot west of the Missoula International Airport in Missoula, Montana 
and is home to 85 smokejumpers consisting of men and women whose ages range, from 
early 20's to 50's (Missoula Smokejumpers, 2004). Surrounding the base are several 
other buildings housing the Region One Fire Cache, the Interagency Fire Science 
Laboratory, Missoula Technology and Development Center (MTDC), and the Northern 
Region Training Center. 
The Missoula Base Smokejumpers "primary job is to suppress wildfires in 
remote mountainous terrain of the western United States" (Missoula Smokejumpers, 
2004). However, they are also qualified as the "initial attack" force in "wilderness areas, 
rangeland, and the desert southwest (Missoula Smokejumpers). They often form the 
"personnel for extended attacks and Incident Command Teams" and can be called out 
almost anywhere in the western continental United States including; Montana, Idaho, 
Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Oregon, California, 
Arizona, and Alaska (Missoula Smokejumpers). During the off season or while waiting 
for calls, smokejumpers are often engaged in prescribed-burning operations all over the 
continental United States (Missoula Smokejumpers). They are also used as tree climbers 
in New York and Chicago to help with an "ongoing insect eradication program" 
(Missoula Smokejumpers). 
Organizationally, the Missoula Smokejumper Base has a formal hierarchy which 
begins at the top with the Region 1 Smokejumper Program Manager, also known as the 
Base Manager. Just below him oh the organizational chart is the Base/Operations 
Manager, or the Assistant Base Manager followed by five individual foremen each 
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individually assigned to one of the following responsibilities; Fuels/Projects. Internal 
Base Operations. Parachute Loft. Airplane Loadmaster. and Training. Below this group 
are five Assistant Foremen who are assigned to work with foremen and help them 
accomplish their specific responsibilities (e.g.. fuels, internal base operations, loft, etc.). 
Following the assistant foremen on the organizational chart are the GS-7"s or Squad 
Leaders who in turn supervise the GS-6's, or regular smokejumpers, with a wide range of 
experience ranging anywhere from 2 years and over. Last on the totem are the Rookies, 
or first-year jumpers. For a graphic chart of the Missoula Smokejumper Organization, 
please refer to Appendix D. 
Smokejumper Identity 
From the early years of smokejumping to the present day smokejumpers have 
developed a unique identity. As reflected in N. Maclean s (1993) best-selling historical 
book investigating the Mann Gulch fire of 1949, an "important [part] in becoming a 
Smokejumper is learning to act like one" (p. 30). Several key values are tied into what it 
means to be a smokejumper. First, on an organizational level, it has been reliably 
described as a "brotherhood" and "fraternity" (National Smokejumper Association & 
Smith, 2000; N. Maclean, p. 27). In fact, a common way of addressing fellow 
smokejumpers is to call them "bro" even if that "bro" is a woman (National 
Smokejumper Association & Smith). 
This commitment to the organization and to one another is evidenced in the lives 
of current and former smokejumpers across the country. One smokejumper relates a 
situation in which he was asked by a former "bro" who was dying in a hospital to take his 
ashes and scatter them for him from a flying airplane. He remarked that his loyalty to this 
28 
fellow smokejumper was "unconditional" (National Smokejumper Association & Smith. 
2000). One of the female jumpers continued to jump even while she was pregnant 
because she loved the work so much. After she had her son. she went back to jumping for 
several years before giving it up (National Smokejumper Association & Smith). Another 
man jumped during his younger years then went on to get a "real" job founding a 
successful accounting business. After se\ era) years away, he left his business and became 
a jumper once again in spite of the lower wages (National Smokejumper Association & 
Smith). These examples show the tenacious nature of the job. People who do it typically 
enjoy what they do. They have a strong loyalty to one another and to the profession. 
Additionally, key to a discussion about the underlying values that make up what it 
means to be a smokejumper is a sense of "pride " and "romanticism" that goes along with 
being a smokejumper (N. Maclean, 1993). According to N. Maclean smokejumping is "a 
highly select outfit somewhat like the Marines" (p. 27). He writes about how early 
smokejumpers would return from fires and go to the bars to brag about their near-misses 
to the girls. Smokejumpers are also well known throughout the field for their 
independence and self-reliance (J. N. Maclean, 1999) which are also qualities expressed 
more locally by the Missoula base. 
Smokejumpers at the Missoula base have described themselves on their website in 
a number of revealing ways. They are "self-sufficient" and "capable" (Missoula 
Smokejumpers, 2004). reinforcing a "can do" attitude (Weick, 1995). The Missoula 
smokejumpers at the Mann Gulch fire were confident in their ability to do their jobs and 
referred to it on first glance as a ten o'clock fire (N. Maclean. 1993) or that they w ould 
get the job done by ten o'clock the next morning and be on their way home. As 
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mentioned, this ''can do" attitude was also criticized at the South Canyon Fire. This 
attitude highlights the confidence jumpers have had in their own abilities o\ er the last 60 
years. 
In short, smokejumpers since the beginning days to 1994 ha\ e had a very specific 
and unique identity construct made up of several key values embodied in the following 
terms: ''brotherhood" (National Smokejumper Association & Smith. 2000) or " fraternity" 
(National Smokejumper Association & Smith; N. Maclean. 1993). "dedicated"", 
"professional"', "highly-trained"", "experienced"", "self-sufficient"" "capable"" (Missoula 
Smokejumpers, 2004), and "can do"" (Weick, 1995) as expressed in both word and action 
by smokejumpers themselves as well as the wildland fireflghting community. 
Participant Demographics 
This study represents a relatively diverse group of smokejumpers at the Missoula 
Base based on official rank, years of experience, and gender and is comparable to the 
demographic proportions of the entire population. In terms of official rank. 5 of those 
interviewed were GS-6"s or regular smokejumpers with two or more years of experience, 
3 were Squad Leaders, 5 were Assistant Foremen. 5 were Foremen, 1 was upper 
management, 1 was a former jumper that was now on the personnel staff at the base, and 
2 were former jumpers that were now working in other areas of wildland fire 
management and/or training. 
It is also interesting to note the relatively even spread of smokejumpers across the 
category of work experience within the field of smokejumping. The largest portion of 
those interviewed had worked there over 15 years. This helped significantly since a large 
portion of the interview targeted issues that compared the world of smokejumping prior 
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to South Canyon in 1994 to issues in a post-South Canyon community. More specifically, 
of the 22 interviews. 6 had been jumping for over 20 years. 6 had been jumping between 
16 and 20 years. 3 had worked between 11 and 15 years. 5 were between 5 and 10 years, 
and two had worked there less than five years. 
One seeming exception to the general rule of e\ en distribution among participants 
in this study is in the category of gender. Of the 22 participants. 19 w ere male and 3 w ere 
female. However, while this ratio may look lop sided, it is a higher representati\ c sample 
of the actual smokejumper population where, of the 85 jumpers w orking at the base, 78 
are male and 7 are female. 
The demographics of the participants suggest that they are well qualified for a 
study of this kind. Most of the participants in this study held some level of management 
over other smokejumpers. As a result, it makes sense that the core values and beliefs they 
report as part of what it means to be a smokejumper would be communicated down the 
chain of command to the lowest level part-time rookies coming into the organization both 
in formal training and socialization efforts as well as less formal observation and 
mentoring. By understanding how experienced and seasoned veterans of the organization 
make sense of who they are and how they manage the inherent tensions that up their 
organizational identity in practice, we should have a much clearer idea of those themes 
play out throughout the entire organization. 
However, since most of the participants in this study were seasoned full time 
smokejumpers who were often part of the organizational overhead, this study may be 
limited in what it can say to the entire smokejumper community. For example, the time 
constraints of this study excluded large numbers of rookie smokejumpers as well as part-
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time smokejumpers that may have important and possibly different views of w hat it 
means to be a smokejumper. While targeting the fulltime leadership of the smokejumper 
organization has recognizable benefits to a study like this, as detailed abo\ e. it \\ ould be 
important to include rookies and part-time jumpers in future research in order to get a 
more accurate idea of the entire smokejumper organization and to locate any dcMant 
themes of identity present in their ranks. 
Method of Inquiry & Instrument 
1 conducted this study using semi-structured interviews using an interview guide. 
According to Lindloff & Taylor (2002), "interview guides.. .consist of groupings of 
topics and questions that the interviewer can ask in different ways for different 
participants" and typically allows for considerable flexibility for both the interviewer as 
well as the participant (p. 195). Using an interview guide was especially helpful for this 
group since they often had additional comments and experiences to share that often 
veered off the strict order of the interview questions. My interview guide covered ten 
questions (Appendix C) targeting issues related to smokejumper identity, changes in what 
it means to be a smokejumper, changes in the smokejumper organization since South 
Canyon in 1994, and accounts of experiences smokejumpers have had dealing with the 
tension between safety and aggression. Previous studies have shown that interview 
questions that draw out accounts and experiences from participants have been an 
effecti\ e means of getting at the core values and beliefs that structure identity and bring 
about identification (DiSanza & Bullis, 1999; Larson & Pepper. 2003; Tompkins & 
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Cheney, 1983). In this study. I relied heavily upon questions similar to those used by 
Larson and Pepper and Tompkins and Cheney in their studies, asking open ended 
questions about experiences that described what it meant to be a member of the 
smokejumper organization. 
Interviewing has been a productive way of getting at issues of organizational 
tension (Tracy, 2004) and specifically at identity tensions (Larson & Pepper. 2003) as 
well as larger issues of identity and identification (Bullis & Tompkins. 1989; DiSanza & 
Bullis, 1999; Larson & Pepper; Larson & Tompkins. 2005; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). 
Even interpersonal scholars advocate more qualitati\ c methods when researching 
dialectical tensions (Baxter, 1988). 
Larson and Pepper (2003) frame interviews in terms of'Interview talk" (p. 537) 
which they argue is a legitimate means of getting at narratives of identity. For example, 
when people talk about their experiences they emphasize certain values and de-
emphasize less important values in terms of the details they share and how they interpret 
those details. Larson and Pepper frame language as a means by which people make sense 
of experience and reveal the core values that make them who they are. 
In terms of this study, experiences shared during interviews represented the 
communicative process of identification and revealed the core values which structured 
their identities. These core values stood out through their discourse not only explicitly as 
they identified important values and beliefs that make up how they saw themselves, but 
also in the types of experiences they shared and the details they pointed out from those 
experiences. How they talked about themselves in the context of their daily work said as 
much about the core values that implicitly defined their identities as express explanations 
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of core values. Since identity is rooted in constructs of \ alues and premises (Scott et al.. 
1998) and since identification is a means by which members make sense of the w orld 
(Larson & Pepper, 2003). getting participants to talk about their lived experiences as 
smokejumpers carried within them the patterns of competing values and premises that 
structured what it meant to participants to be smokejumpers. 
Procedure 
In January 2005. I received institutional review board authorization from the 
University of Montana to conduct this study and interx iew ed 20 smokejumpers and 2 
former smokejumpers using a semi-structured intcr\ icw approach between February. 
2005 and April, 2005. The majority of these participants w ere stationed as full-time and 
active jumpers at the Missoula Smokejumper Base. Participants were selected using a 
snowball data gathering method which provided a list of people to contact. Due to the 
seasonal nature of the job, 1 was limited to those who were working full-time and were 
available for interviews. As a result, while targeting names from referrals given to me by 
organizational members working at the base, the participants were ultimately a 
convenience sample. Participants received no immediate benefits from participating in 
the study, but were promised a full briefing, video taped for those unable to attend the 
actual presentation, following the final analysis and write up of the collected data. 
Interviews were based on a ten-question interview instrument and averaged 45 
minutes to an hour each. Individual participants had time to ask questions about the study 
and review the interview questions before the interview began. Several participants asked 
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more in depth questions about the study following the interview, resulting in unrecorded 
conversations that lasted anywhere from 5 to 1 5 minutes. Interview s were kept 
conversational by allowing the direction of the conversation to dictate the order and 
emphasis of the interview questions. 
Of the 22 interviews, 21 were conducted on site at the Missoula Smokejumper 
Base while one participant requested that I meet him at his apartment in Missoula as a 
matter of personal convenience. One participant approached me a day after his interview 
and spoke with me about specific concerns he had dealing with current litigation against 
firefighters following the Cramer fire incident. At his request, 1 listened to his concerns 
and took field notes, but did not include the information because it did not seem germane 
to the direction of this study and because it was not recorded on tape and then transcribed 
for accuracy. After half of the interviews were conducted, I began transcribing tapes and 
alternated between transcribing, interviewing, and analysis until I had finished 
transcribing 21 of the interviews. I attempted to transcribe participant I "s interview, but 
found the tape inaudible due to the extreme poor quality of the audio recording caused by 
mechanical problems during the interview. As a result only interviews 2-22 were 
transcribed and analyzed for use in this study. 
The data were analyzed using a modified grounded theory approach (Lindloff & 
Taylor, 2002). 1 took preliminary notes during each stage of the data collection, 
transcription, and formal analysis in order to document emerging themes while they were 
fresh on my mind. I began the formal analysis by reading through the 267 single spaced 
pages of raw data derived from transcribing 21 interviews and looked for emerging 
themes of values and beliefs that constitute the smokejumper identity and patterns of how 
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people talked about the relationship between various identities. During this stage of 
analysis "the analyst usually goes through the texts.. .line by line and marks those chunks 
of text that suggest a category" (Lindloff & Taylor. 2002. p. 219). My goal was to 
identify the prevalent themes that constitute how smokejumpers see themselves and how 
they discursively frame the relationships between larger categories of emergent themes. 
At multiple times during the formal analysis, I would break aw ay from the data and w rite 
about impressions and ideas that came to mind dealing w ith the characteristics and 
relationships between themes, experimenting with categories and codes that would 
accurately address the patterns 1 was finding. Throughout the fonnal analysis 1 found that 
the emerging patterns fit nicely with previous research dealing w ith identity (Scott et al., 
1998), tensions (Tracy, 2004; Martin, 2004; Harter, 2004). and dialectics (Baxter, 1988). 
After comparing my findings with what others had found, I would then return to the data 
and organize the themes 1 was finding into preliminary categories, placing chunks of text 
into such emergent categories as independent, connected, leader, follower, safety, 
aggression, and bureaucratic, concertive. Using categories represented in previous 
research in tandem with emergent categories and themes from participant data has been 
productively used in other qualitative tension-based research (Tracy, 2004). Comparing 
each category with the raw data led me to adjust them in accordance with prevailing 
themes from the data that described how smokejumpers saw themselves. Returning to the 
transcribed data several times to verify the themes and categories I was finding, two 
codes of discourse emerged from the data representing the primary identity tensions 
smokejumpers faced: safety/aggression, independent'connected. 
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Using this same process of moving "line by line" through the data, I looked for 
emergent themes representing the discursive ways that participants talked about each 
code of identity tension. Similarly, the process of moving line by line through the text 
looking for themes was punctuated by personal notes and departures from the text to 
write about relationships and possible connections between themes and emerging 
categories as well as consistent reference to previous literature dealing with tension 
management techniques as a means of more accurately identifying emergmg themes and 
categories as 1 moved back to the data. Through this process, two codes of discourse 
emerged dealing with how participants framed identity tensions in practice which are 
presented in detail in the following chapter. 
Because of the unique nature of one of the codes that emerged from this data set, 
a brief explanation of its inductive roots may be helpful. While the tension between 
safety and aggression was one that was identified early on as part of the Ten Standard 
Fire Orders and one that many wildland firefighters must cope with (J. N. Maclean, 
1999), themes emerged from the data that suggested that participants actually felt they 
were "safe" firefighters and also that they were "aggressive" firefighters. As a result, 
while deductively beginning this study with an understanding of the tension between 
safety and aggression, the fact that each end of this tension was seen as part of what it 
meant to be a smokejumper emerged inductively from the interview data and therefore 
constituted a legitimate code of identity tension. 
Personal names were transcribed just as they were used during the interviews to 
maintain clarity and flow of ideas, experiences, and explanations during the analysis, but 
were omitted from the text used in the final results and discussion to preserve 
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confidentiality. As part of the formal analysis process, I performed a member check \\ ith 
one of the participants (Lindloff & Taylor, 2002) who validated many of my findings as 
accurate with his own lived experience and also offered several insights that w ere taken 
into consideration prior to final analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two I gave a brief background of areas related to this study, described 
the participants, explained my method of inquiry, and detailed the procedure I followed 
in conducting this study. In Chapter Three I will answer the research questions introduced 
at the end of Chapter One by presenting the interview data I collected and analyzed. The 
research questions 1 introduced in Chapter One \\ ere; 
RQl: What are the primary identity tensions smokejumpers must manage? 
RQ2: How do smokejumpers discursively manage identity tensions in daily 
practice? 
RQ3: How does the tension between fighting fire aggressively and providing for 
safety first: a) challenge and/or reinforce smokejumper identity, and b) get 
reshaped by smokejumper identity in actual practice? 
Smokejumper Identity Tensions 
Smokejumpers have a very pronounced understanding of who they are. This sense 
of self was apparent in their discourse. The most widely and explicitly reported 
characteristics included: "loyalty,"hard working," "dedicated." "goal oriented," "safety-
conscious," "aggressiv e." "competitive," "professional." "elite," "independent," "team-
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oriented," "misunderstood," "leaders," "can-do," a "brotherhood," "responsible," and 
"diverse." Each of these values casts the smokejumper in a slightly different light, adding 
depth and meaning to how they see themselves. 
The data showed that smokejumpers have several identity tensions they deal with 
on a daily basis. While there was remarkable clarity and consistency for some identity 
tensions, others were incomplete and/or inconsistent. For example, some participants 
talked about the difficulties the job placed on their family lives, reporting that they tried 
to leave the organization simply because the pay was low or they wanted something that 
kept them closer to home. While this suggested that smokejumpers felt tension between 
their professional and personal identities, tensions like this did not represent the majority 
of those interviewed. Due to the lack of continuity among participants. I did not feel such 
tensions represented conflicting "core" values that "structure" (Scott et al., 1998, p. 303) 
what it meant to the majority of participants to be a "smokejumper." Rather, they seemed 
to represent local, micro tensions individuals may face when navigating the threads that 
make up their individual rather than professional identity. 
In the first section of this chapter 1 will report the two identity tensions most 
pervasive among the discourse of this study and most intimately linked to smokejumper 
identity. Two themes of identity tension were universally acknowledged by all 
participants. They provide the most reliable and openly agreed upon explanation of what 
it means to be a smokejumper: safety/aggression, independent/connected. 
In this first section, 1 will answer RQl: What are the primaiy identity tensions 
smokejumpers must manage? 1 will first talk about how smokejumpers see themselves 
simultaneously as "safe" and "aggressive" firefighters (safety/aggression). I will then talk 
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about how they also see themselves as extremely independent, self-reliant, and 
autonomous individuals while at the same time affirming their connection to one another 
and to the wildland fire community (independent/connected). 
Safety/Aggression Tension 
The tension of safety aggression describes how smokejumpers see themselves as 
both safe firefighters while simultaneously thinking of themselves as "aggressix e." "can-
do" firefighters. The paradox of this tension was openly laid out in Chapter One as an 
express organizational imperative, making it a difficult tension to pass by in the course of 
this study. However, it was impressive how openly and emphatically participant 
discourse highlighted these two tensions not only as mandates imposed upon them by 
their employer, but as deep-rooted characteristics that when taken together actually 
constituted what it meant to he a smokejumper. Importantly, seeing themselves as ''safe" 
firefighters contradicts and complicates relatively flat descriptions of the modern 
smokejumper as simply "aggressive" and "can do" firefighters (J. N. Maclean, 1999). 
Safety/Aggression: Smokejumpers as "Safe " Firefighters 
The safety/aggression tension describes how smokejumpers see themselves 
simultaneously as both safe and aggressive firefighters. Smokejumpers were very clear 
that they felt they were "safe" firefighters. However, they expressed their identity as safe 
firefighters on various levels. Participants often suggested that being "safe" firefighters 
was something the organization expected of them as employees. One way they expressed 
this expectation was by talking about the "safety first" mantra. One participant with over 
15 years experience talked about how "safety first" was a policy every smokejumper 
should be aware of: 
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1 mean its clear as a bell.. .and if you re not hearing it. man, your ears are 
plugged.. .It's safety first. You don't" take on unnecessary risks to save 
vegetation. That's just policy... 
While being "safe" firefighters as part of an organizational expectation for employment, 
smokejumpers typically felt they were "safe" firefighters on much deeper levels. 
Smokejumpers not only acted in safe ways, being safe firefighters as a means of 
appeasing bureaucratic requirements, but they actually saw themselves as "safe" peop/e -
recognizing safety as a deep rooted core value. One smokejumper with more than 15 
years experience positioned the value of safety as a gatekeeper over what of people 
should be allowed into their ranks; 
You have to look — how can 1 do this and go home tonight or at the end of 
the fire. No one wants to die out on those fires and if they do we don't 
want them in our ranks. We don't want those kind of people... 
This participant felt that the kind of people that made good smokejumpers were safe 
people that "go home" at the end of the day. This sentiment of being a certain kind of 
person, a safe person, was something that many of the jumpers talked about by 
comparing themselves to other wildland firefighters they felt were less safe. They seemed 
to do this in an effort to build up the value of safety as an integral part of what it meant to 
be a smokejumper. One participant with more than 20 years experience in the field, said 
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that smokejumpers were the kind of people that always wore their seat belts and the kind 
of people who always wore a bicycle helmet when biking to w ork. He reported that he 
once saw a helitack crew member, who had been preaching the safety mantra at a training 
meeting, climb onto a motorcycle without a helmet at the end of the day and dri\ c home. 
After talking about this situation, he pointed out that smokejumpers were much safer 
people than many of the wildland firefighters because they recognized unsafe situations 
and took precautions. This suggests that safety is not only an important, defining quality 
of smokejumpers, by helping them see who belongs in their ranks, but it is enough of a 
core identity trait that it can be used to separate themselves from other wildland 
firefighters. 
Many of the participants talked about the ideal of safety as a responsibility they 
had towards others, something they accepted with the title of being a "smokejumper.'' 
This particular jumper recognized a difference between formally mandated duties within 
the organization and informal duties that came from a deep rooted personal sense of self 
as a smokejumper: 
There's been a couple situations that I had to get people out of a bad place 
and it wasn't my duty or responsibility but I just took it upon myself 
because I feel that's on our shoulders just because we wear the title of 
smokejumper. 
As this participant points out, the duty of ensuring the safety of others is part of having 
the title of "smokejumper."' This also points out how smokejumpers see themselves as 
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safe firefighters when they are protecting the safety of others. It shows that 
smokejumpers don't necessarily need to just be thinking about their own safety in order 
to feel hke "safe" firefighters. Part of being "safe" is having a desire to ensure the safety 
of others around them. Other participants talked about safety as everyone's 
"responsibility" or feeling "accountable" for not only their own safety but the safety of 
everyone else on the crew. 
Many participants felt that safety has always been a part of w hat it means to be a 
smokejumper. In fact, during interviews, they talked about being slighted and 
misunderstood by popular media and by the U.S. Forest Ser\ ice. especially during the 
TriData (1996; 1998) studies, who they felt framed them as "daredex ils" that throw 
caution to the wind when approaching a dangerous situation. In an effort to clarify this, 
some of the participants emphasized in their discourse how safety was an important value 
making up the smokejumper identity many years prior to South Canyon. One 
smokejumper, who started up with the Missoula base a few years prior to South Canyon 
stated emphatically that "...the bottom line is safety. We've never, ever, ever veered 
away from that." Other jumpers reinforced this, talking about "common sense"" as a 
typical way of maintaining safety: 
...it's always been common sense; it's never been willy-nilly throw 
caution to the wind—go risk you're life type work. That's not the 
approach anybody ever took... 
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Despite the majority, other participants openly talked about the old days as a time 
when safety was not embodied as much as it is today. One participant felt that older 
smokejumpers were often condemned because critics used today's standards to judge 
people that lived during a different time. He felt that changes in how fire beha\ ed and the 
industry's present view towards fire as an important environmental agent necessar>' for 
healthy forests have placed safety on a higher pedestal than it used to be held on. 
However, despite the minor conflict between participants on how smokejumpers ha\ c 
seen themselves in the past, smokejumpers all agreed that safety was an essential trait of 
what it means to be a smokejumper today. 
Safety/Aggression: Smokejumpers as "Aggressire Firefighteis 
Interestingly enough, while smokejumpers sec themselves as safe people, they also 
pride themselves on being aggressive firefighters. Nearly every participant talked about 
character traits that point directly to aggression as a defining feature of who they are; 
"hard working," ''competitive," "can do," "dedicated." One participant openly laid claim 
upon aggression as an important identity trait defining what it meant to him to be a 
smokejumper: 
... everyone who's in this profession at least to a certain level is the type of 
personality that has common traits.. .as far as aggression, they tend to be 
more of an aggressive type of personality.. .[mjeaning they're going to hang 
it out — they're going to get the job done. They want to be successful, ok. 
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As this participant points out, smokejumpers often share the same personality 
characteristics - one of the strongest being "an aggressive type of personality." 
He also provides a fairly consistent definition of what it means to be "aggressive" 
as something intimately connected to the idea of getting the job done and being 
"successful." 
Many smokejumpers recognized aggression, defined as "getting the job 
done" and being "successful" as important qualities of who they w ere. One 
jumper was very open, stating that he felt smokejumpers were competitive 
individuals and that competition was rewarded within the smokejumper ranks; 
...smokejumpers are probably the most competitive people Tve ever 
worked with and me being the same way that's probably one of the 
underlying reasons 1 probably ended up here and have excelled... 1 hate to 
loose as much as the next person. 
This game metaphor of winners and losers begs the question of who or what 
smokejumpers feel they are competing with. Smokejumpers seemed to report a 
number of things they compete with. Often smokejumpers compete with 
themselves and their environment. For example, one smokejumper stated that his 
move from college football, following graduation, into wildland firefighting and 
then into smokejumping was largely inspired by his personal need for mental and 
physical challenges: 
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Ever since Tve got here, it's more than taken the place of playing 
football...! mean it's got the physical challenge, the mental challenge. 
you've got a reason to train and stay in physical shape and it's just the best 
thing that ever happened. 
As this participant describes, smokejumpers often compete w ith themselves. They 
feel a drive to overcome personal barriers and challenges - something 
smokejumping gives them the opportunity to face. Most smokejumpers explicitly 
included the desire to face and overcome challenges as a premier quality defining 
what it meant to be a smokejumper. 
In addition to competing with themselves, smokejumpers often compete with 
other wildland firefighters. Many of the "success" stories that smokejumpers used to 
describe how they "got the job done" involved hooking a fire (stopping it's progress) and 
starting the mop up (using dirt and water to extinguish all of the flames and ensuring that 
the ground and trees are cold) before another wildland firefighter crew could get there to 
help them finish the job. One participant captured this in one of the experiences he shared 
describing what it meant to him to be a smokejumper: 
You get around the fire and you meet the line you started at where you 
anchored and you caught this thing and in the mean time the district has 
ordered a type 2 team and really there's nothing left for them to do. You 
caught it.. .you"\ e probably heard that from other people.. .That's one of 
the best feelings right there. 
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Through smiles and laughs, smokejumpers consistently talked about surprising 
and impressing other wildland flrefighting crews or the district manager that had 
called them out to the job. This suggests not only that smokejumpers generally 
have a desire to compete, but extending the sports metaphor a bit further - thev 
enjoy the attention that comes from being on the playing field and surprising the 
audience. This need for "competition" and "success" is best captured by the 
smokejumpers' traditional "can do" attitude. 
Much of the criticism that came out of the TriData (1996; 1998) study condemned 
smokejumpers' aggressive flrefighting by targeting their "can do" attitude. In defining the 
"can do" attitude, smokejumpers often reported a difference between the perception of 
the "can do" attitude described by the TriData (1996) study and the preceding 
investigations of South Canyon and the traditional smokejumper "can do" attitude. One 
participant was very direct about this difference; 
It's night and day. Their "can do" attitude, 1 mean the way they put it the 
"can do" attitude is just going like a bull in a china shop and just plowing 
through, head down and going for broke. That's not what our "can do" 
attitude is. Our "can do" attitude is seeing any situation and being able to 
find a solution to get something done. 
As this participant explains, smokejumpers see two definitions of "can do" being 
used within the wildland fire community. One definition seems to "throw caution 
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to the wind." without regard to the safety of others, while smokejumpers claim to 
endorse a "can do" attitude that embraces something akin to positi\ e thinking -
believing they can do the job in front of them. One jumper associated the "can do" 
attitude with "problem solving" and finding solutions. Often the "can do" attitude 
was talked about in conjunction with a sense of being a public sers'ant. Several 
participants commented on how they felt pressure from the wildland fire 
community to maintain their "can do" attitude in order to measure up to their (the 
wildland fire community's) expectations. One participant talked about this 
pressure, suggesting that this "can do" image is not only engrained into 
smokejumpers, but is such an integral part of the smokejumper identity and 
reputation that it actually keeps the smokejumper organization in business: 
We feel like our existence is on people calling you and they're going to 
call you because you can do the job for them when maybe somebody else 
couldn't. So, we feel like we have to almost perpetuate the "can do" 
attitude to stay in business as an organization.. .that's sort of almost 
engrained in you. 
This participant talks about "can do" as not only something that is "engrained in 
you," but as something they feel pressure to maintain in order to "stay in business 
as an organization." Other jumpers expressed this pressure by emphasizing their 
duty to provide alternatives even if they don't feel a situation is safe to engage; 
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Refusing it s one thing - and it's you're right to do - but to us the most 
important thing is providing an alternative - saying "no, we don't want to 
go down there, but we think if we come around here and go drive around 
and tomorrow at 6am before it starts heating up. \\ e come up from the 
bottom, we can do this" Instead of just refusing. The refusal comes \\ ith 
the responsibility to give an alternative. 
By looking at "can do" as a "responsibility" they have to the rest of the wildland 
fire community, it further entrenches this quality as part of who they are. Rather 
than centering this identity trait completely within the smokejumper community, 
it also shows that the wildland fire community shares some of the burden for a 
quality they have largely condemned. 
While participants often focused on the positive outcomes of the "can do" 
attitude, many of them recognized the limitations and boundaries of a "can do" attitude. 
Most often, those boundaries were negotiated along the lines of safety. One participant 
clarifies the boundaries of the "can do" attitude; 
.. .They will "can do" all they can do in those boundaries, you know, of 
being safe...so I would say that the "can do" attitude now is still there, but 
the boundaries under which you have that attitude have changed. 
As this participant expressed, the boundaries of "can do" have undergone a change that 
most of the participants recognized. Some felt stronger about the evidence of a change 
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than others, but it was evident that most of them feh that to some degree the "older 
jumpers'" were more aggressive in the past than they are today. 
As the data in this section show, smokejumpers feel very strongly that they are 
safe fire fighters. However, they also feel very strongly that they are aggressi\ e 
firefighters. Both are tied to their sense of self, making it a formidable identity 
contradiction to navigate if they are to maintain stability as smokejumpers. 1 will now 
talk about the second primary identity tension smokejumpers demonstrated in their 
discourse. 
Independent/Connected Tension 
Along with facing the tension between safety/aggression, participant discourse 
also shows that smokejumpers feel they are at once independent individuals as w ell as 
connected group members. Smokejumpers are well known within wildland fire for their 
fierce independence and self reliance (J. N. Maclean. 1999). Ironically, interview data 
suggests that they also feel a strong connection with the very groups and individuals they 
feel separate from. Dealing with these two opposing ideals complicates the two-
dimensional image we get of smokejumpers in literature and scholarship that seems to 
almost entirely focus on their independence (Driessen, 2002; J. N. Maclean; N. Maclean, 
1993). 
Independent/Connected: Smokejumper as "independent resource 
Smokejumpers see themselves as very independent people. During interviews, it 
became almost cliche to hear participants talk about their independence as an important 
core value that made them who they were. They typically talked about their independence 
m two ways. First it was something that distinguished them from other wildland 
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firefighting crews. Second, it was something that distinguished them individually from 
other smokejumpers within their own organization. An important way they talked about 
how their independence separated them from other wildland firefighting crews was the 
fact that they actively looked for it during the recruiting process and then found ways to 
cultivate it during the training process. One participant was \ ery direct about the 
organization's efforts to promote independence as a core value within smokejumpers 
during the training and recruiting process; 
We're a pretty independent organization. We try to foster that in people. 
Look for that in people that we're hiring and then foster that in the way we 
train them. 
Tompkins and Cheney (1985) point to training and socialization efforts as important 
opportunities to encourage new members to identify with core organizational values. By 
looking for new recruits that already embrace their independence and then actively 
"fostering" that in their training efforts, the smokejumper organization creates a fairly 
concrete division between it and other wildland firefighting organizations. 
Many of the smokejumpers talked about independence by using it as a way of 
distinguishing themselves from other wildland firefighting crews. A 20 year veteran 
boasted about this separation as something the organization promoted by training 
smokejumpers to think independently: 
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You'll see other crews that's just really trying to look the same. Same 
colored hard hats, same t-shirts and walking in a straight line. You cannot 
get a smokejumper crew to walk in a straight line. The training is 
different. Another crew is trained to follow their leader. A smokejumper is 
trained to be thinking for themselves... 
Another participant reported that while ''other " crews often wore the same colored hard 
hats and the same colored backpacks, smokejumpers w ore different colored hardhats and 
backpacks. As if this wasn't enough, they also used stickers, patches and other designs to 
separate themselves from their fellow smokejumpers in an effort to identify themselves as 
a group of non-conformists. Such efforts broadcast to the wildland fire community 
obvious differences that create separation between the smokejumper organization and any 
other wildland firefighting crew. 
Smokejumpers also talked about their independence from other wildland 
firefighting crews by talking about their self-reliance and autonomy on the fire line. One 
participant with more than fifteen years experience highlighted this by pointing to the 
resources available to smokejumpers on a fire and their unique opportunities for 
specialized training: 
...when we end up on a fire somewhere...districts or anybody don't have 
to worry about us because we have everything available to us. If we run 
out of food we call Missoula.. .well next thing you know we have fresh 
food being para-cargoed to us. We have so many people that are trained in 
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so many different areas through the forestry.. .we have strike team leaders, 
we have division bosses, we have so many people trained in so many 
different categories that we're just a, we're an elite group. 
As mentioned by this participant, much of what they are able to get as resources on a fire 
comes from the recognition the industry gives to the title of being a "smokejumper." 
Most, if not all, the participants talked about this division between those who are ''elite" 
or "professional" and those who are not as an important characteristic of the 
smokejumper identity that separated smokejumpers from the rest of the wildland fire 
community. Often this reputation was something that contradicted how they felt about 
themselves as beginning smokejumpers, showing how the separation and admiration was 
largely tied up with the title of "smokejumper" rather than just because they happened to 
have useful experience as an individual. One participant with less than 10 years of 
experience talked about one of his first fires as a smokejumper and how other wildland 
firefighters treated him: 
They bused us to the fire. We got on the fire and the IC pulled all the 
jumpers out of the bus, told us the situation and asked all of us what to do. 
and you know right there in that moment I was like "they really do think 
we're gods of fire" because I don't know what to do. 
It's significant that smokejumpers often reported that they either were attracted to 
smokejumping because it had the reputation of being an "elite" or "top' position in 
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wildland firefighting - separate from other wildland firefighters - or that they didn't 
necessarily feel "elite" as individuals, but that others treated them as "elite" because thc\ 
wore the title of "smokejumper." Either way. being labeled as "elite" or "professional" 
puts some distance between them and the wildland fire community. It suggests that much 
of the independence smokejumpers feel stems from how other wildland firefighters react 
to them in their field interactions. Another smokejumper w ith between 5 and 10 years 
experience talked about how she often felt like other wildland firefighters expected her to 
be something as a smokejumper that she didn t feel she was as a person: 
.. .people expect me to, you know, enter the phone booth and come out in 
my wonder woman suit and that's so far from the truth. So far from who I 
really am. 
This participant, like the previous quote, clearly shows that while she doesn't/ee/ 
"elite" as a person, others in the wildland fire community treat her that way 
simply because she is a "smokejumper." Being a "smokejumper" carries with it a 
title and reputation that brings with it a level of prestige as well as an implied 
separation. However, this implied separation may reinforce the need 
smokejumpers feel to find their omv? way apart from other wildland firefighters. 
Many times participant discussion showed that finding their own way 
involved using "common sense," an important attribute of the smokejumper 
identity. One participant highlighted how "common sense" helped smokejumpers 
avoid doing things that didn't "make sense." To illustrate, he pointed to an 
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example of digging fire line. While the average w ildland firefighter w ould dig 
line a standard handle width completely around the fire even if that meant that 
they would be digging around large rock outcroppings, smokejumpers would 
accomplish the same task by tying into the outcropping and picking up the line on 
the other side of the rock. Experiences like this show how smokejumpers 
separated smokejumpers as an organization by focusing on how their tactics 
employed greater "common sense" than those used by other wildland fire crews. 
in addition to discourse highlighting how smokejumpers" independence 
distinguishes them from the wildland fire community. 1 also found substantial evidence 
that showed how smokejumpers identified strongly with the need to feel like unique and 
independent individuals apart from their fellow smokejumpers. As discussed earlier, one 
way they showed their identification with themselves as unique individuals even w ithin 
the smokejumper ranks was their unwillingness to wear unified hard hats and backpacks 
or to walk in a straight line. Their need to feel independent and separate from their fellow 
smokejumpers may come from how they talked about themselves as leaders. In the 
smokejumper organization, each member of the crew is expected to think independently 
and act as a leader. 
Many if not all the smokejumpers were in leadership positions prior to joining the 
smokejumper ranks. One participant commented that . .the kind of people that are 
brought into this are usually the leaders of where they came from.. .who naturally are 
leading point " It makes sense that placing a group of'"leaders" together who are 
naturally accustomed to leading a fire operation would foster a great deal of dialogue and 
disagreement. 
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While some participants expressed their initial discomfort w ith w hat they saw as 
"dissention among the ranks" during their first few years as smokcjumpers. the practice 
of "speaking out" was supported as an important attribute smokejumpers identified with 
and maintained in their daily work. During one of the interviews, after talking about how 
the U.S. Forest Sei-vice had been encouraging wildland firefighters to speak out if they 
had a safety concern, one of the jumpers interjected with a ring of humor in her \ oice; 
Smokejumpers do that all the time. They're not encouraged by the Forest 
Service — they just do that. They don't need to be encouraged by anybody 
to do that.. .that's kind of a smokejumper personality.. .smokejumpers 
don't need to be encouraged by anybody to speak out about what they 
think is right or wrong...Fm around them a lot so I get to hear that a lot. 
Or question it a lot. 
All the participants viewed the ability to speak out as a unique feature of the 
smokejumper organization and an important part of the individual smokejumper identity. 
They talked about how speaking out established each smokejumper as an equal 
"stakeholder" that had a right to his or her personal "say" in a given fire situation 
regardless of rank. It allowed them to express independent thoughts and separate 
themselves as unique individuals from the rest of the smokejumper organization. As one 
participant stated, being able to express your individual opinion and have it count is 
"...the pride of it [being a smokejumper] " 
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Participant interviews also support that the organization itself promotes 
individual independence as an important part of the smokejumper identity through 
several organizational policies. First, smokejumpers talk about how they are ne\ er on the 
same load with the same people. The jump list which determines w ho is going on the 
next jump was described as something "sacred" that would never be tampered with. 
Many times smokejumpers don't even know how many of them are needed until they are 
up in the plane and flying to the destination. More than one participant said that if s not 
unusual to get up in a plane and come back if they need three jumpers and you are the 
fourth, increasing the uncertainty of who each smokejumper will be working with 
throughout the fire season. 
In addition to the jump list, participants reported that they are hired out to large 
fires individually rather than as pre-packaged crews. One participant talked about the 
variety of assignments they can receive independent of what other jumpers are doing: 
...[smokejumpers are] individual resources and so I might be called to go 
do — hey you want to go do a strike team assignment? You want to go do 
a task force leader assignment? You want to go be a blaster? 
Other jumpers often talked about being on assignments where they were the only 
smokejumpers present, using their leadership training to take charge of hotshot crews, 
district crews, and perform other overhead assignments. Several participants identified 
strongly with being sent to large fires as individual overhead, using these as examples of 
what it meant to them to be a smokejumper. 
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By looking at how smokejumpers' independent identity separates them from the 
rest of the wildland fire community as well as independent from one another. \\ c gain a 
much more complex view of how smokejumpers see themselves. Rather than a single, 
static image, this discourse shows an image of layers and complex turns and twists 
combining together to make up their daily work identity. To further complicate this, 
smokejumpers also strongly identified with the smokejumper organization as a group, 
feeling connected to their fellow smokejumpers, and with the wildland fire community, 
feeling connected to their fellow wildland firefighters. 
Independent/Connected: Smokejumpers as Connected Group Members 
While smokejumpers are proud of their independence from the wildland fire 
community as well as their independence from one another, ironically they also identified 
forcefully with their fellow comrades in the smokejumper organization. During several 
interviews, participants were openly upset with critics who suggested they might not be a 
tight-knit group. They were particularly upset about a study on crew cohesion that 
claimed smokejumpers were the least cohesive crew of all the wildland firefighting teams 
(Driessen, 2002). This participant expressed herself in no uncertain terms; 
...they did this whole study on crew cohesion and how jumpers weren't 
cohesive...bullshit—complete bullshit. 
All the participants echoed her frustration and many talked about feeling more connected 
as smokejumpers than they had felt in other wildland firefighting positions they had filled 
previously in their careers: 
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.. .a couple years ago a cohesion test came out and they were saying 
jumpers were the most uncohesive and I really took offense to it because 
I've been through all the ranks all the different le\ els. shot crew, 
districts, different agencies, everything and it s like 1 feel there's more 
cohesion here than almost anywhere... 
Many participants talked about their connection as a ' loyalty" or "bond," 
stemming from the "quality" of the people they worked w ith. One jumper boldly declared 
that he would be willing to . .take a bullet for these people." Others talked about it as 
"trust" emerging from putting their lives into the hands of the person packing the 
parachute, or choosing the jump spot. One jumper talked about it as smokejumper 
cohesion and felt like this connection came from "...the ability to communicate 
clearly...a clear line of respect - open channels " Most agreed that it was something 
that was hard to explain unless you felt it yourself. One participant suggested why this 
might be the case, talking about it as something that is less obvious to outsiders: 
...it's not the kind of cohesion like we're some kind of NBA team going 
to a national championship—not that that's not there, but 1 don't think that 
people from the outside would pick up on it [smokejumper cohesion] 
unless they spent a good couple weeks watching us interact.. .it's not 
obvious to an outsider. 
Many times this identification with 'ioyahy" and connection came through while 
participants were sharing experiences that described what it meant to them to be a 
smokejumper. One jumper said that what it meant to him to be a smokejumper was best 
described by an experience that had nothing to do with fighting fire. A fellow jumper had 
undergone a personal tragedy and hadn't had time to finish the repairs on his home. This 
participant reported about how the smokejumpers in the area responded: 
. . . 1  came to work and sort of mentioned it to one person and said "hey. if 
we could rally some people together we could all really help him out and 
clean up his place, get some things going for him. You know basically. 
come together." The next morning.. .there was dump trucks.. .just an 
unbelievable amount of people that showed up — all jumpers. There was 
jumpers that came down from Kalispell that retired 30 years ago. There 
was jumpers that had heard through the grapevine that called, sent money. 
1 mean it was an amazing amount of people that came together in the drop 
of a hat simply because of who he is and just how these people are. 
Something that I figured when we first looked was going to take probably 
two or three days, took probably seven hours." 
As this experience illustrates, the connection smokejumpers talk about seems to transcend 
the traditional work relationship, bleeding over into their personal lives. Most participants 
felt they could count on their "bros" for just about anything, even outside of work. Often 
smokejumpers talked about their identification with one another as a result of their shared 
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training experience and a variety of core values they had in common with each other, 
framing this connection with each other as something that was unobtnisn e in nature and 
based on shared values. 
However, their "bond" as smokejumpers was not restricted to those the\ w orked 
with on their own base. Participants often talked about the unique connection they felt 
with the entire smokejumper community nationwide. One participant made it quite clear 
that felt the same connection with smokejumpers they've never met, emphasizing how 
this ideal is caught within the identity of "smokejumper"; 
The person that I don't know - who's gonna rookie in Redding this 
summer - when I get on a fire is as much my bro as somebody who I 
rookied with.. .it's understood that kind of respect and quality of character 
exists no matter where. 
Many of the smokejumpers tied this "respect" and "quality of character to a unified 
national organization that tried to keep things relatively similar in terms of training and 
functionality from base to base. Smokejumpers often gained a sense of continuity by 
working with other smokejumpers throughout the year from other bases around the 
country. 
Ironically, despite their previous themes of independence, smokejumpers' patterns 
of discourse also showed that they readily identified with the wildland fire community as 
well. Many times this came through in the kinds of stories smokejumpers talked about 
during interviews. Rather than talking about smokejumping experiences alone during our 
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discussions, participants would often try to answer a question b\ talking about an 
experience they had as a hotshot crew member or while thc\ w ere w orking on a district. 
At first, this was a bit frustrating and I found myself constantly steering the con\ ersation 
back to experiences they had as smokejumpers. However, these patterns of conversation 
actually expressed the connection they still had with former crews they had w orked with 
in other areas of wildland firefighting. They still felt connected to other w ildland 
firefighters. One participant talked openly about how his hotshot crew was upset when he 
became a smokejumper but how he still felt he was part of their crew; 
I remember when I came off the hotshot crew the people that were on it 
were almost angry at me when I left and that 1 wasn't a part of their crew 
anymore (which I felt like I still was)... 
Even during the interview, this participant talked about how he still felt like he 
was a hotshot, despite more than twenty years of firefighting as a smokejumper. 
This makes sense that they would feel connected since many of them spent five 
years or more fighting fire prior to becoming a smokejumper. 
Other jumpers felt more connected to the wildland fire community after 
South Canyon. It was described as a time of great reflection by a number of 
participants during the interviews. One jumper talked about South Canyon as a 
reality check inspired by losing smokejumpers along with other wildland 
firefighters in the tragedy: 
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...it was a good reality check. It sort of made us - it really forced us to 
realize we re part of the larger community here and it s not just a bunch of 
those dumb other people getting burned up... 
As this participant points out, South Canyon seemed to give smokejumpers a 
greater sense of their own mortality. Many participant accounts agreed with this, 
recognizing South Canyon as a moment of reflection that brought about a greater 
sense of unity within the wildland fire community. Rather than just the other 
"dumb" firefighters getting "burned up," many participants who lived through the 
event openly recognized that the tragedy forced them to acknowledge that they, 
like the rest of the wildland fire community, were mortal and could make 
mistakes. Many times it also called into sharp relief the near misses they had 
experienced that had placed them in a potentially similar position to their "bros" 
at South Canyon. The fact that they had been on the surviving end while others 
had gotten "caught" often reinforced the actuality of their own vulnerability, 
resulting in an even deeper connection to other wildland firefighters in the larger 
community. 
In conclusion, smokejumpers clearly identify with independence, 
separating themselves through their discourse from the wildland fire community 
as well as from their fellow smokejumpers. However, they also very clearly 
expressed a connection to smokejumpers at their own base, smokejumpers 
nationally, and to other areas of wildland fire as part of what made them who they 
were. In combination with the safety/aggression tension, these severe 
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contradictions point to the fragmented and competing ideals that make up the 
smokejumper identity. I will now talk about how they discursi\ ely manage these 
identity tensions in daily practice. 
Tension Management Techniques 
While the contradictions are severe, the participant discourse presented in 
the previous section shows that smokejumpers seem to mamtain a surprisingly 
stable sense of who they are. This suggests that despite significant contradictions 
they have found ways of managing these tensions in order to preserve solidarity. 
In this section, 1 will answer the second research question w hich asked; How do 
smokejumpers discursively manage their identity tensions in daily practice? 
In this section, I will be presenting discursive management techniques 
which represent the patterns of communication organizational members use in 
order to ease the burden and reduce the strain of conflicting tensions on their 
organizational identity. By looking at these patterns of transcribed discourse, my 
analysis points to two primary discursive management techniques participants 
consistently used in order to make sense of themselves amid the significant 
contradictions presented by their own identities. For each of the management 
techniques, 1 will first define the technique, show how participants enacted each 
technique through their discourse, and then show how the technique eases the 
identity tensions discussed in the previous section. 
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Discourse of Haiinonic Compatibility 
The discourse of harmonic compatibility deals with discursively 
positioning two opposing identities together by reframing conflicting identity 
tensions as separate but complementary identities. Participants typically enacted 
this management technique by discursively positioning one identity as the means 
of achieving the other in practice. For example, in talking about how safety 
allowed them to fight fire more aggressively, several participants talked about 
how the LCES safety mantra (Lookouts, Communication, Escape routes. Safety 
zones) (Gleason, 1991) actually allowed them to be more aggressive and efficient 
firefighters: 
1 think it's easy to manage safety and doing your job, because that's part 
of your job...If you're doing your LCES while you're doing your job, 
you've got safety and efficiency. You're doing it. 
This participant describes safety as something that is written into what it means to 
aggressively fight the fire (e.g. "doing your job") and therefore is easy to do because it is 
already "part of the job." However this example points out a cost to framing two 
opposing identities as complimentary partners. Through the discourse of harmonic 
compatibility, the mutually exclusive frame of being "safe" and being "aggressive" is 
exchanged for a new definition of safety that supports and actually defines what it means 
to fight fire aggressively. Values that were once solely used to define what it meant to be 
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aggressive (i.e., "doing your job," etc.). suddenly find expression in what it means to be 
"safe."' 
Other participant discourse substantiated how this discourse was used as a means 
of refi-aming safety as a necessary prerequisite of being aggressive. Some said that to 
aggressively fight fire without first making sure they had lookouts posted or escape 
routes secured would be "asinine" and something they wouldn't even consider - it was 
part of the job. Others talked about safety as a contributing "challenge" that w as just part 
of what they had to overcome on the job in order to ..[get] on the ground safely..." or 
to make sure everyone ".got home..." at the end of the day. In other words, being a 
"safe" firefighter was achieved simultaneously with being an aggressive firefighter by 
reframing safety as part of getting the job done (e.g., being "aggressive"). 
Participants also emphasized the need to aggressively attack small fires in order to 
ensure safety that might be compromised if fires were allowed to grow into large, multi-
crew project fires. In other words, being an aggressive firefighter actually allows them to 
be safe firefighters by helping them achieve a greater condition of safety for themselves 
and others. One participant explained it as a frustration he had with management attempts 
to ensure their safety: 
... they are trying to evaluate, evaluate, before they call us in - before they 
even engage their people.. .and see what the risk is and it just actually 
exposes us to more risk...a small fire like this in the morning — this room's 
size - in the morning its this size, in the afternoon it's the size of the 
building.. .so you are exposing that many more people to the situation. 
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Another smokejumper had a similar response, saying that "...just about all of us here feel 
that aggressive fire fighting is safe fire fighting and that's because you contain it [the t1re] 
small." Again, by reframing safety as the achievement of containing fires small, this 
participant frames safety in terms of what it means to be aggressive (i.e.. being 
"successful," "get the job done," etc.). In our interview, the same participant reinforced 
this definition of safety by talking about a situation where smokejumpers spotted a small 
fire on a ridge just outside of Missoula, Montana. They requested authorization to engage 
it, but were denied and told to wait while higher ups got them official authorization. 
Before they could get authorization, the once small fire quickly burned out of control, 
eventually threatening several homes and endangering the li\ es of residents not to 
mention putting additional firefighting crews at risk. This participant was frustrated 
because he felt that an aggressive use of a few smokejumpers while the fire was small 
could have reduced the amount of danger hundreds of others were placed in. He talked 
specifically about the role of being aggressive in achieving greater safety: 
.. .we're containing the risk. If we fail to catch a fire and it gets that big or 
even a tenth of that big now you're going to bring in extra crews, you've 
got tens of thousands of snags out there, you've got rolling rocks, you've 
got all this stuff. So that's why aggressive is good. 
Once again, this frames what it means to be a "safe" firefighter as someone that 
can successfully prevent the dangers of large fires, thereby reducing the risk of 
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injury to themselves and others, but positions safety as an accomplishment that 
can be brought about by an aggressive firefighter who wants to "get the job done" 
and wants to be "successful" (as defined by putting the fire out). As a result, in 
order to be both a "safe" and "aggressive" firefighter - all jumpers have to really 
focus on is being "aggressive." By being aggressive firefighters and attacking 
fires while they are small, smokejumpers are able to support two identities at once 
and eliminate the tension caused by opposing ideals. 
There seems to be enough consistency in the data to suggest that, when using the 
discourse of harmonic compatibility to engage the tension between safety and 
aggression, smokejumpers consistently favor being an aggressive identity by 
reframing what it means to be "safe" in terms consistent with how they define 
themselves as "aggressive" firefighters. 
In addition to the safety/aggression tension, the data also show that smokejumpers 
used the discourse of harmonic compatibility to manage the tension of 
independent/connected. They enacted this in practice by talking about how being an 
"independent" firefighter actually constituted what it meant to be a smokejumper "crew." 
One of the jumpers emphasized this, highlighting the unusual freedom he felt by being 
part of a smokejumper crew; 
...it [smokejumping] has that level of freedom that you can't find - or it's 
hard to find in other crews because of the fact that if s [independence is] 
part of the crew. 
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This participant points to how independence is actually part of being a member of a 
(smokejumper) crew. Again, smokejumpers used one identity to achie\ e the other being 
part of a crew allowed them to be independent because independence as an ideal w as 
built into what it meant to be a smokejumper crew. Another participant talked about how 
being part of the smokejumper organization actually opened doors for greater 
independence because the organization valued this as an important attribute to "foster" in 
people: 
We're a pretty independent organization. We try to foster that in people. 
Look for that in people that we're hiring and then foster that in the w ay w e 
train them. You'll be counted on to act independently to make your own 
decisions. 
Aside from the oxymoron of being an "independent organization," this smokejumper 
reinforces identity as a shared value among participants that constitutes group 
membership. As this participant suggests "independence" is framed as an important 
quality the smokejumper organization looks for in those they hire and something they try 
to "foster" in those they train. As a result, being independent actually achieves a sense of 
connectedness because it is an important quality shared by all organizational members. 
This seems to suggest a view of connection akin to organizational identification based on 
shared values. 
Many participants focused on how their ability to independently express their own 
ideas in the field brought them close together. One participant suggested that 
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brainstorming independent ideas and maintaining open communication where people felt 
comfortable speaking their mind was an act that brought them closer together as a group: 
That's what brings you close is communication...I'm not saying that 
trying to get a buzz word going, but 1 mean, what brings people tight? 
What makes them stick?...either they ha\ e spent a long enough time 
together that they don't really need to say e\ erything or they have to ha\ e 
a system of respect with built in — "what do you think? What do you 
think?"... 
This participant talks about open communication patterns (independence) that bring 
members closer together (connection). This reaffirms that smokejumpers seem to view 
connection in terms of identification based on the shared value of independence. 
Looking at specific examples of how the tension between independence and 
connection are managed in practice suggests that smokejumpers seem to reduce the 
tension between the two by framing independence as a shared value and connection as 
the resulting condition of identification brought about by communicative expressions 
which reinforce an independent identity. Once framed in this way, smokejumpers only 
have to focus on being independent in order to feel connected. 
In a world where safety allows smokejumpers to aggressively get their job 
done, where "aggressive fire fighting is safe firefighting" [italics mine], and 
where independence reinforces connection, it's a challenge to see how any single 
smokejumper could possibly feel like his or her identity was fragmented or even 
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conflicted. It s no doubt that these opposing identities make strange bedfellows, 
but by forcing them together (e.g.. saying that to do one allows them to do the 
other), participants effectively nullify much of the contradiction they may 
experience between the two in their everyday lives. Using discourse to 
reconstitute each identity as separate but complementary allows smokejumpers to 
stabilize the turmoil each tension may cause to their overall sense of self by side­
stepping the conflict and fragmentation through reframing one identity in terms of 
how they define the other. 
Discourse of Situation "fit" 
Another management technique emerged from the data during my analysis. I 
found consistently that smokejumpers talked about shifts in the tensions between 
safety/aggression and independent/connected based on the needs of the situation. The 
discourse of situation "fit " deals with talking about the needs of the situation as a means 
of negotiating identity in practice. Participants enacted this technique throughout their 
interviews by talking about the situation as a justification for how they managed a 
particular tension. 
Many participants talked about unique characteristics of the situation as a 
justification for how they managed a particular tension. Often they did this by 
denouncing rigid rules as an inadequate way of managing fire. One participant went so 
far as to say that anyone that tried to use "black and white" rules as a means of 
negotiating how safe or aggressive to be in a situation had an "unsafe" attitude. He 
maintained throughout his interview that it was the situation not the rules that defined 
what was safe and what was overly aggressive: 
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...You never want to be black and white about anything. As soon as you 
start looking at everything [as] a black and white situation, that's an 
unsafe attitude ...Tve cut fire line down hill in Southern California at 
night a couple of times - majority of times you usually don't. It was 
appropriate at the time. The fire was really inactive and it w as the fastest 
way for us to get it done. There was a crew working from dow n below too 
working towards us and it was appropriate, it was ok. 
Talking about cutting line downhill as something that should be considered safe, 
depending on the situation rather than a generalized rule, is a significant 
statement. The U.S. Forest Service has been very clear about its position on 
digging line downhill — digging line downhill is prohibited. Investigations leading 
to the TriData study (1996) found this to be a significant reason why the 
firefighters on Storm King Mountain got into trouble. When digging line 
downhill, firefighters place themselves in a fairly vulnerable position. If burning 
logs rolled down hill, which is often the case, or if the fire spotted, sending 
burning sparks from the main fire down to the bottom of the gulch, a fire could 
start which could then race up the hill and catch the unwary firefighters. However, 
digging line downhill allows firefighters to get more line in with less energy since 
they are digging down rather than up. This participant is saying, quite openly — 
something that many other participants agreed with during my interviews — that 
the conditions of the specific situation should control whether they can be more 
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aggressive on a given fire not the rule book. Another jumper concurred, openlv 
disagreeing with the rigidity of the newly written Ten Standard Fire Orders: 
There's people out there that say, "Don't bend em; Don't break em. ' 1 
don't think you can do that all the time and accomplish the job.. you re 
going to dig downhill because the environment here is going to let you do 
that. You're not going to do it just because you're lazy and that's the 
easiest way to get the line in. 
Taking this argument in a slightly different direction, other participants talked 
about situation as a better way of navigating their contested identities than cultural norms. 
One participant was extremely upset about a situation he was in when his smokejumper 
crew boss chose to follow the cultural norm of requesting feedback from all the jumpers 
(inviting them to embrace an "independent" identity) rather than just making the decision 
as a leader (inviting them to embrace a "connected" identity as crew members) that 
needed to be made based on the circumstances they were in. He told the following story: 
.. .for a few of us that were standing there it was no question what we 
needed to do, where we needed to go, and why we needed to go - it was 
that quick. But to him, it was "I need everybody's input on what's going 
on." And we're like "Where have you been, hey look down at that fire. 
don't you think it's getting hot down there? Can't you see it's coming 
up"... I do have my points to where "hey let's stop what we're doing, let's 
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meet back up on top and discuss it. " but I make sure we re the hell out of 
wherever. I'm not going to sit there while the fire's going looping and go 
"hey, what do you think?"... 
As this jumper points to, despite cultural trends such as this one where iumpers are 
accustomed to giving their opinion and acting in more independent w ays, there are 
clearly moments in daily practice when it is better to just make a decision and act in more 
connected ways. Those turning points in deciding \\ hether to embrace more of a 
connected identity verses an independent one are clearly managed according to the needs 
of the situation rather than a generalized rule or cultural norm. 
There are important reasons why situational management is a good way of 
managing smokejumper identity in practice; wildland fire is unpredictable and constantly 
changing. One jumper pointed this out during the interviews; 
It's like 1 said, it's dynamic. It changes at the drop of a hat depending on 
the wind and weather, fuels or whatever — things that are beyond your 
control sometimes. 
The discourse showed that many of the smokejumpers recognized that there was 
only so much a person could do to manage a fire. One participant clearly recognized that 
"...when it's going to do its thing, its going to do its thing. So, you just have to keep out 
of the way." Another smokejumper described fire as an unstoppable "hurricane"" and 
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talked about the situational elements that motivated him to shift from more of an 
"aggressive" identity to more of a "safe" identity during one experience on a fire; 
We flew over a fire and I was the person in charge and ] had a lot of 
rookies on that plane load and I asked for some reinforcements 
immediately—an air tanker to come in and drop on this fire. And 1 was 
told "no' and my priorities immediately changed. 1 had a focus on the fire 
and when they said "no, we're not going to give you what you need." I 
knew at that point we wouldn't catch it. So it was real clear that we 
weren't and so my full attention was in to making sure that the crew was 
safe.. .what 1 think that that teaches you is that you can t stop a hurricane. 
You can't stop a fire that's going to roar to the top of the hill once it gets 
the power behind it. 
As this account shows quite clearly, this participant began the operation with a 
fairly aggressive mindset that he was going to catch the fire. However, he 
mentions some important situational clues that motivated him to shift gears and 
embrace his identity as a "safe" fire fighter. First, he points out that the crew 
mostly consisted of "rookie" members, suggesting that a fresh crew of rookies 
were too inexperienced to chance managing this fire. Second, he clearly explains 
that his request for reinforcements was denied. Following this, he states that these 
two situational elements came together and helped him see that he wouldn't be 
able to completely accomplish what his "aggressive" self wanted to do — he 
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therefore embraced his identity as a ''safe" firefighter and focused on the safci\ of 
his crew. 
During another interview one of the participants talked about how 
situational elements created division within the crew. Following a fire blowup, 
smokejumpers decided it was best to go into the black (embracing a "safe" 
identity) where the fire had already burned and w ait for it to die down a bit before 
reengaging it. The participant described the experience including his take on 
much of the dialogue: 
One of the old jumpers - really old, jumping since the 60"s, he says "I'm 
going to go over and hook up with somebody else," one of our jumper in 
charges. And about four of us said, well, no we're staying here, we're in 
the black, its fine — there's nothing we can do. It's, we've got to let this 
thing go. We'll pick it up when the wind dies and we get more resources 1 
mean it's gone — there's nothing. I mean look at that retardant thing, it 
looks like its dumping fuel on the fire instead of retardant. It's just going. 
And he said "no, we'll be safer if we go around. We'll go around back and 
we'll go..." It got to be quite the heated argument and there was a lot of 
cursing and "you guys aren't tough like the old guys were".,. 
Following this, the older jumper chose to separate himself from the majority 
group, taking a younger jumper with him and leaving the majority of the jumpers 
in the black. The situational elements that motivated the majority group's decision 
to disengage (abandoning their "aggressive" identity in favor of a "safe" identity) 
and stay in the black included: excessive wind activity, lack of resources, and 
overly aggressive fire activity. 
While most of the crew collectively decided it was best to stay in the black 
(embracing what they thought was a "safe" identity combined w ith more of a connected 
"crew" identity), there were other situational elements that motivated the older crew 
member to take his course of action (embracing an "independent" identity). As shown 
above: he felt it would be safer to go around, he felt that the other jumpers w eren't as 
"tough" as the old jumpers used to be. However, in both cases, their negotiation of the 
tension between independent and connected was done by recognizing and adhering to 
situational elements. 
This particular example also points to a bit of cross over between the 
safety/aggressive tension and the independent/connected tension. While the argument 
was rooted in the safety/aggression tension it led to choices that involved negotiations 
dealing with their identity as either an independent individual or a connected group 
member. This makes sense since both tensions are both part of the larger construction of 
the smokejumper identity. However, this overlap is also rooted in the tension 
management technique that is being employed by the smokejumpers. Situational 
management implies a level of subjectivity because it is based not only on the 
subjectivity of what they see, but also on how they individually interpret and make sense 
of what they see. If they interpret things differently it stands to reason that smokejumpers 
will face choices that involve acting independently or submitting themselves to the 
decision of the group. 
When smokejumpers engage in situational management they ease the tension they 
feel between conflicting identities by prioritizing one over the other. Howe\ er. neither 
identity seems to completely consume who they are in the moment. They may prefer one 
in one situation over the other much like a craftsman would prefer one tool over another 
depending on the type of work the situation called for. but the data shows that they keep 
the other at the "ready" if the situation changes. By choosing the identity in tension that 
best meets their needs, they reduce the amount of stress they feel trying to force a square 
peg through a round whole, so-to-speak. Safety is a better identity to keep at the forefront 
than aggression when danger is high, resources are low. and the experience level of their 
crew is under developed. Connection is preferred in a fast paced situation when spending 
time allowing everyone voice would jeopardize their safety. Regardless of which end of 
the tension smokejumpers choose in actual practice, it is evident from the data that they 
choose the one that has better "fit." Those that go against the grain, choosing the identity 
that contradicts the nature of the situation, seem to get the most back-lash because it 
places them in a state of high stress. 
Safetv/Ag2ression & Smokejumper Identity 
This last section will engage the findings from this study related to the final 
research question. The third research question asks: Ho^v does the tension between 
fighting fire aggressively and providing for safety first: a) challenge and/or reinforce 
smokejumper identity, and b) get reshaped by smokejumper identity' in actual practice/ 
To answer this question I will first talk about how the tension challenges how 
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smokejumpers see themselves, then talk about how the tension reinforces how thev see 
themselves, and then show how smokejumper identity reshapes the tension in practice. 
Safety/Aggression Challenges Smokejumper Identity 
The safety/aggression tension seems to challenge how smokejumpers see 
themselves in two ways. First, the safety/aggression tension challenges how 
smokejumpers see themselves because safety has largely been defined by the U.S. Forest 
Service in terms of rules based structures like the Ten Standard Fire Orders. 
Smokejumpers pride themselves on refusmg to conform and follow certain rules and 
policies. One jumper openly framed non-conformity as a unique smokejumper strength: 
.. .our best strengths are what dri\ e the fire community the most nuts - Our 
non-conforming to certain things — certain rules — and our non-conforming 
to certain procedures. 
In place of "certain rules," smokejumpers seem to prefer less rigid structures like 
"tradition" and "common sense" that acknowledge them as "experienced" firefighters. As 
shown through participant discourse presented earlier in this chapter, smokejumpers often 
don't feel like "safe" people if they have to conform to strict black and white mandates 
that offer little situational flexibility. 
However, the U.S. Forest Service has historically defined what it means to be safe 
as behavior that complies with the Ten Standard Fire Orders (Thackaberry, 2005). In 
addition, smokejumpers feel that over the last ten years the U.S. Forest service has 
"loaded the safety boat" with far too many rules that paint them into comers. While 
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smokejumpers obviously don't disagree with being "safe/" they have difficult> 
swallowing safety when it is defined in terms of following a printed list of relati\ cly 
inflexible procedures because it contradicts who they are as non-conformists. This 
challenges how smokejumpers see themselves because even though the\ see themseh es 
as non-conformists they are largely obligated to follow them in their dailv work lives. In 
situations where they must comply with organizationally defined safety protocol rather 
than using their own "common sense," smokejumpers actively contradict deep set \ alues 
that help them make sense of who they are. 
Second, this tension challenges how smokejumpers see themselves by creating an 
expectation of perfection. Smokejumpers universally agreed that South Canyon brought 
in its wake an increased emphasis on the need for safety. While there was slight variation 
with some reports, most agreed that the increased emphasis on safety within the field has 
created some impossible expectations for their performance. One participant expressed 
his frustration in being held to an impossible standard: 
...we have these ten standard orders that are fairly nebulous. You look at 
them and I can't guarantee you that when I'm on a fire that when 
interviewed the next day or whatever that every single firefighter on every 
single crew that's out there is going tell an interviewer that I assured that 
he personally knew what the expected fire weather was, for instance. I 
mean, I can broadcast it to the crew leaders, you know, or I can have a big 
briefing where I talk to 120 people at the same time and shout it out but 
you know. So a lot of those things are just really impossible. 
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Being held to an impossible standard clashes and challenges how smokejumpers see 
themselves because they feel they are defeated before they even begin. Smokejumpers 
see themselves as firefighters that "can do"" almost anything they set their minds to do. 
They have a very strong motivation to overcome obstacles and "succeed."" Howe\ er. 
setting a no failure policy to the standard orders and expecting firefighters to demonstrate 
unconditional, all-knowing execution of those orders makes it impossible for 
smokejumpers to succeed because they themselves are not perfect. As a result, safety and 
aggression challenges how smokejumpers see themselves by suggesting they "can t do"" 
what they are expected to do. As a result, while smokejumpers see themselves as "safe"" 
firefighters - they never quite get the same recognition from the industi^ because what it 
means to be "safe" is tied up in faultless adherence to bureaucratic policy. 
Safety/Aggression Reinforces Smokejumper Identity 
Ironically, looking at safety/aggression tension as something rooted in rules and 
procedures simultaneously reinforces smokejumper identity by emphasizing the 
differences between smokejumpers and the rest of the wildland fire community. While 
they may have to conform to standard safety protocol as part of a day 's work, being 
confronted with safety rules provides them with a convenient foil by which to define 
themselves as independent non-conformists. Smokejumpers are not the type of people 
who keep their mouths shut when they disagree with something. As the first section of 
this chapter illustrates, smokejumpers don't need encouragement to speak out and share 
their opinions. Throughout the interviews, participants were openly disagreed with long 
lists of rules and the direction the U.S. Forest Service has taken in expecting them to 
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adhere to those rules with relative perfection. However, by talking about their 
frustrations, the rules-based safety/aggression tension actually allowed thcni to distance 
themselves as smokejumpers from the U.S. Forest Service and other wildland firelighters. 
In essence, their discourse reconfirmed their identity as independent firefighters. 
Many times the experiences they shared focused on orders thc\ w ere gi\ en bv 
fellow wildland firefighters set as incident commanders over them on a larger project fire. 
Under such circumstances, one participant suggested that as long as a mandate from the 
supervising firefighter didn't clash with situational cues that might indicate danger, they 
would typically comply. However, this didn't mean they would follow the order happily. 
Often compliance came hand in hand with a great deal of grumbling and complaint. 
Other times, when safety rules came as an order from the district super\ isor. as long as 
they could accomplish the same task doing things their own way, smokejumpers reported 
just ignoring what they were told and doing it the way they thought was best. Under rare 
circumstances, for example if a direct order placed them in what appeared to be an unsafe 
situation (based on the situational elements), smokejumpers would refuse to follow the 
order — one time being thrown off the fire as a consequence to their open refusal. While 
such dramatic displays are obviously less common in the post South Canyon community, 
mostly as a result of policies which reinforce individually sanctioned protests based on 
unsafe directives, such dramatic reactions were the stuff of legend within the 
smokejumper organization and talking about them reinforced how smokejumpers saw 
themselves as non-conformists. In any case, having to live in a community that for the 
most part still values obedience and relatively quick compliance with rules and orders 
provides smokejumpers with ample opportunities to express their disapproval and thereby 
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reinforce their own independence from the wildland fire community and, bv so doing, 
reconfirm their unique connection \\ ith one another. 
Smokejumper Identity Reshapes Safety/Aggression in Practice 
How smokejumpers see themselves also reshapes the tension of safety/aggression 
in practice through the communicative ways in which they respond and manage this 
tension. The discourse of harmonic compatibility and the discourse of situational "til"" 
provide two unique ways in which smokejumper identity reshapes the safety/aggression 
tension in practice. Smokejumpers see themselves as "can do"" individuals. They want to 
be successful and they pride themselves on being able to "get the job done."" Many of the 
participants' interviews felt strongly that part of what it meant to be a smokejumper had 
to do with overcoming challenges, both personal and professional. Rarely if ever did I 
hear participants talk about joining the smokejumper ranks because they wanted to be 
"safe"' or because they wanted to ensure the safety of others. They felt being "safe" 
firefighters was a responsibility they had to one another and others in the field and part of 
being a smokejumper in consequence of those connections — but they seemed to place a 
stronger emphasis on attracting individuals who were interested in overcoming 
challenges, who were problem-solvers, hard workers, etc. etc. As a result, it makes sense 
that how they talk about the tension between safety and aggression would reflect these 
core values. As the previous section suggests, the discourse of harmonic compatibility 
appears to function as a means of reducing the stress of opposing identities by framing 
safety in terms of what it means to be "aggressive." In other words, it frames safety as a 
condition brought about by "aggressively fighting fire" and therefore something closely 
related to being "successful" and getting "the job done. " They see themselves as "safe 
firefighters if they are aggressive rather than the other way around. As a result, using 
discourse to reframe this tension in light of how they see themselves suggests a definite 
preference for their identity as "aggressive'" firefighters. This provides a stark contrast to 
how the U.S. Forest Service seems to define safety as following safety orders and 
aggression as something brought about as a result of following those systematic orders. In 
effect it fiips the organizational perception of this tension on its head. 
Similarly, managing the tension using the discourse of situational "fit"" seems to 
reshape safety/aggression in unique ways as well. Smokejumpers see themselves as 
experienced firefighters who have "common sense."" Managing safety and aggression 
situationally reflects this view of how they see themselves because being closely 
connected to situational cues implies a high level of experience in being able to recognize 
subtle shifts in weather, topography, fire behavior, and an alertness to human factors cues 
in crew members dealing with crew experience, trust, fatigue, etc. As a result, choices 
made in the situation between either a safe identity or a more aggressive identity are seen 
as "common sense"" — something any seasoned and experienced firefighter would 
recognize and support. However, by situationally managing the tension between safety 
and aggression, smokejumpers effectively base their definition of safety and aggression 
on the evidence provided by the situation rather than the strict rules-based model 
provided by the Ten Standard Fire Orders or the U.S. Forest Service. Situations are not 
"safe"'just because rules 1-9 have been complied with — rather, they are "safe"' if by their 
experience and "common sense," they interpret situational cues as signals that they are 
"safe"' or capable of being more or less "aggressive." 
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However, recasting the safety/aggression tension in terms that contrast the U.S. 
Forest Service definition of safety/aggression as one that is defined in terms of "safet\ " 
and one that is defined in terms of following "rules'" may have some unexpected 
consequences for the smokejumper organization. Essentially, the bind comes in that 
smokejumpers are largely supported in their emphasis of aggression over safety and 
recognized for their experience and "common sense" by the rest of the wildland fire 
community. Many of the smokejumpers felt a great deal of pressure to maintain a "can 
do'" attitude in order satisfy the wildland fire community s expectations of them. They 
often felt obligated to be "can do" and successfully meet objecti\ es because they had a 
reputation in the field for being the kind of people that could do what others could not do. 
One participant, quoted in the first section of this chapter, was so clear on this point that 
he deserves to have his words repeated: 
We feel like our existence is on people calling you and they're going to 
call you because you can do the job for them when maybe somebody else 
couldn't. So, we feel like we have to almost perpetuate the "can do" 
attitude to stay in business as an organization.. .that's sort of almost 
engrained in you. 
As this participant implies, perpetuating the "can do" attitude as part of what it means to 
be a smokejumper provides a great deal benefit to the rest of the wildland fire 
community. By reinforcing this identity, the U.S. Forest Service maintains a relatively 
gritty breed of firefighters willing to approach and determined to overcome obstacles 
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other firefighters may have been uncertain or incapable of o\ ercoming. It also seems 
obvious that by supporting this attitude, the rest of the wildland fire communit\ has at its 
disposal a crew of firefighters who can save them a great deal of moncv should they 
decide they need to corral a specific fire and just "get the job done" rather than letting it 
bum. As a result, it seems in the best interest of the \\ ildland fire community to continue 
reinforcing how smokejumpers see themselves as "aggressi\ e" firefighters, treating them 
as experienced and situationally savvy firefighters if only to maintain them as an on-call 
resource. 
Although the field may support how smokejumpers reframe safety/aggression as a 
means of maintaining the status quo over their own responsibilities and budgets, doing so 
severely impacts how smokejumpers are perceived within the tleld. For example, while 
smokejumpers may continue to see themselves as "safe" firefighters, constituted by 
defining safety in terms of aggression and defining it situationally rather than as a result 
of conforming to "certain rules" and "procedures," they may not be seen within the U.S. 
Forest Service as "safe" firefighters. This seems to come about quite simply as a 
difference in how the two groups define what it means to be "safe." Since smokejumpers 
define it differently, they may feel they are being extremely "safe" firefighters, while 
being condemned by the wildland fire community and the U.S. Forest Service as working 
outside the bounds (they have) set for being "safe." Since how they view the 
safety/aggression tension is closely tied to how they see themselves, this bind may be 
extremely difficult for them to slip away from. 
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Summary of Results 
In this chapter I have presented my results and answered my three research 
questions. It seems from the analysis of this data that not only do smokejumpers see 
themselves in much more complex ways than they are viewed by outside members of the 
wildland fire community (Driessen, 2002). seeing themseh es as both "safe" and 
"aggressive'' and both "independent" and "connected," but that how they manage these 
tensions in practice reflects much deeper le\ els of how they see themseh es as safe and 
aggressive, independent and connected. By managing these tensions using the discourse 
of harmonic compatibility, we see that they effectively mute the strain between tensions 
by largely redefining one identity in terms of the other. They redefine what it means to be 
a safe firefighter in terms of what it means to be aggressive and redefine what it means to 
be an independent firefighter in terms of what it means to be connected (largely viewing 
connection as a bond that results from the shared value of being "independent"). 
It is also quite clear to see how a rule-based model of what it means to be safe and 
aggressive, as held to by the U.S. Forest Service, challenges how smokejumpers see 
themselves as "experienced" and "common sense" firefighters who don't conform to 
"certain rules" and "certain procedures." This chapter also highlights how 
safety/aggression challenges how they see themselves as "can do" firefighters by 
emphasizing what they "can't do" in terms of unattainable organizational expectations. 
However, it's fascinating that while challenging how they see themselves on several 
levels, this view of safety/aggression simultaneously acts as a foil by which to reinforce 
their view of themselves as "independent" non-conformists, connected to one another by 
this shared virtue. The last, and probably most important, thing this anaK sis seems to 
suggest is that how smokejumpers make sense of themselves reshapes the 
safety/aggression tension in ways that may be reinforced by the w ildland fire communit\ 
in practice, but may also be condemned by them as being "unsafe" according to a rules 
based model of safety/aggression. As a result, this may place smokejumpers in a difficult 
double bind where they may feel like they are "safe" firefighters, according to how they 
view what it means to be safe, while reinforcing an identity within the w ildland fire 
community and U.S. Forest Service of being overly aggressive and unsafe firefighters. 
The next chapter will discuss the theoretical and practical implications resulting from the 
results of this analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
In Chapter Three I presented the findings of this research study and answ ered the 
following research questions: 
RQl: What are the primary identity tensions smokejumpers must manage'.^ 
RQ2: How do smokejumpers discursively manage identity tensions in daily 
practice? 
RQ3: How does the tension between fighting fire aggressively and pro\ iding for 
safety first: a) challenge and/or reinforce smokejumper identity, and b) get 
reshaped by smokejumper identity in actual practice? 
In this chapter I will first present several theoretical implications of this study on the field 
of organizational communication. After doing this, 1 will then present several practical 
implications of this study on the smokejumper organization and the wildland fire 
community. 
Discussion: Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Previous research has pointed to the conflict and contradictions of organizational 
life (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a; 2004b), particularly when dealing with conflicting 
identities (Larson & Pepper, 2003; Scott et al., 1998). This study reinforces and extends 
previous research into organizational tensions by looking at them as issues of identity. As 
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a result, this study provides several theoretical implications which affirm the producti\ e 
use of a tension-centered perspective on the study of identity and identification in 
organizations. As an applied study, it also provides several practical implications that 
directly affect the smokejumper organization and the wildland fire community. 
Theoretical Implications 
There are two primary theoretical implications this study can offer to the field of 
organizational communication. First, this study reaffirms and extends pre\ ious research 
dealing with organizational identification and tension management techniques. Second, 
this study reinforces the tension centered approach as a productive way of looking at 
organizational identity and identification. 
This study reaffirms and extends previous research with organizational 
identification and tension management techniques. Previous scholars have theorized 
(Scott et al., 1998) and offered empirical evidence for (Larson & Pepper, 2003) a 
structurational model of identification. This model embraces identity as a structure 
brought about by the patterns of communicative expression (identification) that make up 
organizational life, emphasizing the cyclical way in which identifications and identities 
create, maintain, and alter one another (Larson & Pepper; Scott, et. al.). This study 
reaffirms this relationship with empirical evidence, focusing on the daily and unavoidable 
identity tensions organizational members are faced with, and how their communicative 
management techniques (e.g., identification) maintain and reshape the structure of those 
identities in practice. As this study suggests, how organizational members make sense of 
the daily identity tensions they are faced with through discursive practices constitutes the 
process of identification as framed by Scott et al. 
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Such discursive patterns ease the tension between conflicting identities and 
influence how members view themselves. For example, while claiming opposing 
identities, the participants in this study used specific discursi\ e management techniques 
that allowed them to maintain a relatively stable sense of who they were as 
smokejumpers. The discourse of harmonic compatibility achieved this by framing one 
identity in terms of the other, while the discourse of situational "fit " effecti\ ely fluctuated 
between identity alternatives depending on the unique needs of the situation. We see 
through this study that management techniques, while employed as a means of easing 
identity tensions, constitute the process of identification and actively reshape how 
members see themselves in practice. Smokejumpers who employed the discourse of 
harmonic compatibility actively reshaped their own identity by emphasizing what it 
meant to be "aggressive" over what it meant to be "safe." By using the discourse of 
situational "fit," members maintained an identity consistent with being "experienced" and 
having "common sense." However, this study shows that such identities also reinforced 
and entrenched the ways in which participants communicated about these tensions by 
reshaping those identity tensions in ways consistent with how they viewed their own 
identity. This study therefore supports a structurational model of identification with 
empirical data that reaffirms the role of identification as a communicative means of 
shaping identity and being shaped by identity. What's more, as a tension-centered 
approach, this study has targeted the daily unavoidable tensions members face as part of 
their daily lives (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004a). As such, it offers a unique scholarly 
perspective that supports the process of identity creation, maintenance, and change as 
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something that is not only accurate, but so common as to find expression in e\ cn the most 
common acti\ ities of organizational life. 
Previous work has also focused specifically on management techniques used in 
balancing the tension between conflicting identities. This study supports and extends 
several recent studies targeting organizational tension management techniques generalh 
and more specific techniques related to managing multiple identities as productive ways 
of managing unavoidable tensions. The techniques expressed in this study confirm two of 
those found by Tracy (2004) in her study of how prison guards manage organizational 
tension in practice. She found that two important and fairly positive ways prison guards 
managed tension was by framing tensions as complimentary edicts or as vacillating 
contradictions (pp. 136-137). When framing tensions as complimentary edicts. Tracy 
found that organizational members used one tension as a means of achieving the other. 
When framing tensions as vacillating contradictions, Tracy found that members 
acknowledged the contradiction between two opposing ideals, but toggled back and forth 
between them "depending on the time, target or content" (p. 136). This study lends 
support to such techniques as relatively positive ways of managing tension. Using the 
discourses of harmonic compatibility and situational "fit," participants in this study were 
able to effectively mute the strain they may have otherwise felt from contradicting 
identities. However, in contrast to Tracy's whole-hearted affirmation of complementary 
dialectics as the solution to organizational distress, this suggests that even this 
management technique may have negative ramifications on individual members if they 
choose to frame identities in ways that contradict larger organizational interpretations. As 
such, while this study supports previous work dealing with tension management, this 
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study also complicates what is meant by "productively"" and "successfully " managing 
tension. This study suggests that future research must not only answ er the question of 
whether or not a specific management technique effectively restores harmony to 
individuals, but how those management techniques impact indi\ iduals as they interact 
with organizational interpretations. 
In addition, this study supports relative consensus in the field for the productive 
use of context-driven responses to tension. In their review of Martin (2004). Harter 
(2004), and Tracy's (2004) recent studies targeting organizational tension. Ashcraft and 
Trethewey (2004b) argue that contextually based responses to tension may be a 
productive way of engaging daily tensions. However. Tracy adds an important caution, 
suggesting that one downside to managing tensions situationally is that it may create the 
image that organizational members are "inconsistent and haphazard'" as they respond to 
changing circumstances (p. 136). 
This study recognizes a situational approach to managing tension as relatively 
productive, but also supports Tracy's (2004) caution. Situational responses seem to be 
most effective because they justify moves back and forth between opposing identity 
tensions by using situation in the capacity of evidence. Larson and Pepper (2003) argue 
that organizational members use "logic" (p. 544), or evidence seen as credible to a 
particular group, to justify moves between conflicting identities (p. 544). Logically 
justifying moves between two opposing identities using situational evidence is a 
productive way of meeting the needs of dynamic and changing environments because it 
allows members to conceptually make sense of opposing structures of identity in their 
minds while maintaining the flexibility needed for adaptation to unexpected 
94 
circumstances. As contextual elements shift, situational e\ idence allows members to 
justify moves between identities in fluid w ays that can acti\ ely cope with fast paced and 
complex choices. Using situational evidence as a means of negotiating complex 
interactions also provides a useful way for organizational members to make sense of their 
choices retrospectively (Larson & Pepper; Weick. 1969) and seems to be a convenient 
way of being able to defend one s choices in organizations that value on the ground 
perspective. In agreement with recent research highlighting the use of context driven 
responses to organizational tension (Harter, 2004; Martin. 2004; Tracy) and multiple 
identities (Scott et al., 1998), this study suggests that identity management techniques 
rooted in the situational context of organizational life can be extremely beneficial to 
organizational members by giving them the flexibility to engage shifting organizational 
conditions. However, this study also suggests that responding situationally may have the 
unexpected consequence of distancing members from organizations that embrace strict, 
rules-based models. 
In addition to supporting and extending previous research, this study reinforces 
the tension centered approach as a productive way of looking at organizational identity 
and identification. Ashcraft and Trethewey (2004a) emphasize three important claims 
that a tension-centered perspective makes about organizational life. First, the tension-
centered perspective emphasizes the "fundamental irrationality of organizing" (p. 83) by 
centering organizational tension as a "normal condition of organizational life" (p. 81). 
Second, the tension-centered perspective reinforces how organizations are "gendered" (p. 
81). Third, the tension-centered perspective positions "organizational irrationality," and 
the tensions inherent within that irrationality, "as an applied concern" (p. 81) which 
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serves to identify '^more and less enabling" management techniques (p. 82). This study 
can contribute to two of these issues. 
First, a tension centered lens points to a significant difference betw een conceptual 
recognition of identity tensions from a researcher's perspective and how organizational 
members themselves experience those tensions as part of their daily li\ es. From the 
outside looking in, identity tensions seem severe and irreconcilable, howe\ er a surprising 
lack of strain seems to more accurately describe how organizational members experience 
the tensions that make them who they are. Smokejumpers seemed relati\ ely comfortable 
with what appeared to be fundamental oppositions. They lived with them on a daily basis 
and, what's more, they did not see them as fundamentally contradicting. In fact, 
participants in this study seemed almost offended when they were labeled only as 
"aggressive" or 'Independent." Such flat descriptions did not fully capture who they were 
as organizational members. Participants at the Missoula base not only had to deal with 
daily identity tensions but they didn't feel like legitimate members of the organization 
without them. This suggests that organizational members not only gain a much richer 
sense of identity by talking about the opposing identities that make up who they are. but 
that what it means to be a legitimate member of an organization is intimately tied up in 
contradiction. As a result, identity tensions seem to not only be constitutive of larger 
identifications emerging from the combined interaction of severe contradictions, but are 
surprisingly unobtrusive, almost lost in the shuffle so-to-speak, when experienced by 
members in everyday life. 
Second, as a tension-centered perspective on identity and identification this study 
also highlights the profound impact management techniques can have on how 
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organizational members see themselves and how this might impact future behavior, 
answering the call for research that targets the "particular outcomes " of identity 
management choices (Larson & Pepper, 2003. p. 553). This study shows that how 
members manage conflicting identities restructures those identities in specific ways. For 
example, smokejumpers actively framed safety as part of what it meant to be aggressive 
and by so doing actually framed w hat it meant to them to be "safe" in terms of what it 
meant to them to be "aggressive." This is an important finding because it suggests that 
the management choices members subscribe to not only allow them to a^ oid the 
debilitating anxiety that might follow unaddressed tensions, but actually influence how 
they interpret their own identities. This underscores the importance of research that not 
only targets how tensions are managed, but research that targets how daily tensions are 
managed since daily management techniques may be more entrenched and unconscious 
and therefore more difficult for members to become aware of. 
As a study that follows the impact that discursive management techniques can 
have on organizational members through to logical organizational consequences, this 
study can also comment on more specific outcomes of selected management techniques. 
Looking at how organizational members manage their identities reframing one in terms 
of the other suggests that reframing itself may have specific impacts on decision making. 
As this study shows, when organizational members frame one identity in terms of 
another, they effectively redefine that identity with the structured values of the other. 
Doing this allows members to reduce the strain on their sense of self, but does it only by 
sacrificing some of the unique values and decisional premises that make that identity 
unique. Simon (1976) argues that organizational identification reduces the clusters of 
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available alternatives members are aware of when making decisions. In this wa\. by 
inculcating members with specific decisional premises they are able to control behaxior 
and choices unobtrusively (Simon, 1976; Tompkins & Cheney. 1985). Since identities are 
structures of values and decisional premises created, maintained, and altered through the 
process of identification (Scott et al.. 1998). it makes sense that the specific combinations 
of values and decisional premises which structure identities also provide unique clusters 
of alternatives by which members make choices; therefore, overlap between opposing 
identities may suggest that potential clusters of unique alternatives during decisions are 
also reduced. Reducing the alternatives of choice may be a benefit to organizational 
members when making decisions by reducing what they are able to process in the 
moment, but also has the potentially negative effect of blinding members from productive 
possibilities lost through framing one identity in terms of the other. As a result this study 
has something unique to contribute to the field of communication studies by suggesting 
that how members manage identity tensions may impact their decision making ability. 
Future research is needed to produce a more detailed model of how identity management 
strategies might function in practice to help or hurt decision making in organizations. 
Practical Implications 
Safety as a Professional Identity 
One of the primary recommendations of the TriData (1998) study to the U.S. 
Forest Service following the South Canyon disaster was to encourage them to implement 
a "safety" culture. To do this, TriData recommended that they find ways to integrate the 
value of "safety" as part of what it meant to be a professional firefighter. Data from this 
study suggest that the U.S. Forest Service may largely have accomplished this act within 
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the smokejumper community. Smokejumpers w ho participated in this study disagreed on 
whether Jumpers prior to South Canyon had as strong a desire to be "safe" as did jumpers 
a f t e r  S o u t h  C a n y o n .  S o m e  f e l t  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  j u m p e r s  h a \  c  " a l w  a y s  b e e n  t h i s  w  a > o t h e r s  
felt that jumpers before South Canyon were never "willy-nilly, throw caution to the 
wind," but may have been more willing to "hang it out " a bit more. How ever, participants 
were universally agreed that contemporary jumpers w ere "safe" firefighters. This 
suggests the smokejumper organization, in the last ten years, has professionalized 
"safety" as part of what it means to be an elite firefighter — of what it means to be a 
smokejumper. 
Reason (2000) argues that organizations interested in maintaining safety protocol 
must create and maintain a culture of safety. Creating a safety culture allow s 
organizations to penetrate the deeper recesses of organizational behavior (Reason), 
allowing organizations to control their members unobtrusively (Tompkins & Cheney, 
1985), and therefore allows them to influence members even when they are in the field 
acting on their own (Kaufman, 1960). However, Reason explains that safe cultures are 
bound by debilitating paradoxes. For example, organizations' efforts to provide for 
greater safety often bring about greater dangers. 
Many participants in this study suggested several new dangers that have resulted 
from the industry's push for greater safety. Nearly every participant pointed out 
frustrations with the work/rest guidelines which restrict firefighter work/rest periods to a 
2:1 ratio. If they work 16 hours on a fire, they must be off the clock for 8 hours. This is 
frustrating to initial attack firefighters who are used to being able to work hard until the 
fire is out. Participants consistently pointed to the new found dangers this safety protocol 
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placed them in. By compelhng them to leave the fire line and be off-the-clock. 
smokejumpers reported that it often allowed the fire to grow beyond the control of an 
initial attack crew. Combined with safety measures restricting fighting fire at night, 
smokejumpers talked about having to watch as the fire grew from 1 or t\\ o acres to 20 or 
30 acres by the time they could reengage. This required more firefighters (often \\ ith less 
experience), placed them in dangerous transition periods (Driessen. 2002), and compelled 
them to fight the fire during the hottest parts of the day instead of at night w hen the 
relative humidity is higher and temperatures are cooler. The South Canyon Ten Year 
Review (Safe Fire Programs and Forest Stewardship Concepts. 2004) engaged this issue 
reporting that one of the primary similarities between the South Canyon. Thirty Mile, and 
Cramer fires were that the fatalities all occurred when firefighters were engaging the fire 
during the hottest times of the day. As a result something that was meant to increase 
safety by making sure firefighters had time to rest may have the ironic quality of 
increasing the danger they face. 
Following a similar flow of thought, this study suggests that considering oneself a 
"safe" firefighter as part of a professional identity may also lead to some dangerous 
outcomes. Smokejumpers openly talked about themselves as safe people. What's more, 
many of those interviewed were openly defensive about accusations to the contrary. This 
suggests that being "safe" in their own eyes has become a protected and entrenched part 
of their professional identity. 
However, there is a danger when individuals begin to think of and talk about 
themselves as "safe"Thinking of oneself as a safe person suggests a startling 
level of confidence in being able to consistently act in safe ways. People w ho already 
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think of themselves as "safe" may not be as aware of the dangers surrounding them as 
those who are still striving for safety. This suggests that ha\ ing a "safe" identity ma\ 
present a potentially compromising framework by w hich organizational members make 
sense of the world around them (Larson & Pepper. 2003). For example, Weick (1905) 
argues that when beliefs and actions contradict one another either the belief has to changc 
to agree with the action or the action has to change to agree with the belief. 
Smokejumpers in this study often defended generally accepted "unsafe" actions like 
digging line downhill as "safe" because the situation allowed them to do \\ hat they w ere 
doing. With significant pressure from the organization to maintain an identity of safety as 
part of what it means to be a professional, smokejumpers may be more inclined to justify 
increasingly aggressive behavior under the umbrella of "safety." Using the discourses of 
forced compatibility and situational "fit" may mask truly dangerous and over-aggressive 
actions as "safe." 
However, the real danger in doing this seems to be how it may destabilize 
traditional boundaries between safety and danger. Justifying aggressive and dangerous 
behaviors as safe may make it difficult for smokejumpers to fully recognize when they 
are acting in dangerous ways. As a result, while seeking safety is an important attribute of 
any organization, it may be dangerous to see oneself as a "safe" person. 
Smokejumpers, Crew Cohesion, and Identification 
Unique to the smokejumpers are the bonds that tie them together. Smokejumpers 
are unique in the field of wildland firefighting because they do not work in pre-set teams. 
Rather, as discussed in the previous chapter, smokejumpers are utilized throughout the 
field as "independent resources." It makes sense that they would not be closely tied 
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together primarily because they are constantly working with different people, being sent 
all over the country to ''boost"' other bases, and have such a tierce independence. 
However, this study suggests something more about the modem smokejumpcr that 
complicates current ideas about crew cohesion. 
Driessen (2002) introduced crew cohesion as an important quality leading to safer 
crews during transition fires. He defined crew cohesion quite simply as the bonds that 
hold people together in groups. In his study he presented two types of crew cohesion; 
intercrew cohesion, intracrew cohesion. Intercrew cohesion describes the bonds that hold 
individuals together as tightly knit crew members. Intracrew cohesion describes the 
connectedness independent crews have with one another when uniting under a common 
banner to engage a large project fire or to handle a fire transitioning from small to large. 
His study claims that "crew cohesion is "made" by individual workers themselves 
when they establish agreements about the rules that govern a host of their day-to-day 
work practices" (p. 7). Cohesion is based on open communication of ideas, team work 
(Driessen, 1996), and "...comes about only after crews have tested and negotiated 
acceptable norms governing their work practices" (Driessen, 2002, p. 7). In other words, 
in addition to other conditions of crew cohesion, Driessen (2002) argues that it takes time 
for "workers to "click" into crews" (p.7). Because cohesive crews need significant time 
interacting before they "click" together, Driessen believes "...it would be wrong to think 
that smokejumpers work in cohesive crews" (2002, p. 14). 
However, Driessen's (2002) final evaluation does not account for several 
variables presented in my study. First, smokejumpers attest to strong bonds that tie them 
together despite their lack of crew-ness. Second, smokejumpers have a strong track 
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record for avoiding disaster — something Driessen (2002) identities as an important 
byproduct of strong crew cohesion. Third, smokejumpers ha\ e a strong tradition of open 
communication that binds them together. 
TriData (1998) offers additional insights, arguing that military research has shown 
that "operational cohesion does not have to be tied to how long a crew has w orked 
together," but is instead connected to essential cohesion issues like "respect, well-defined 
and communicated roles and responsibilities, and active control of bairiers to 
cohesion..." (5-75). As a result, cohesion within the smokejumper ranks seems more 
closely linked to their strong identification with one another based upon shared values 
than it does upon their constant interaction with one another. This suggests the field may 
need a definition of crew cohesion that more adequately accounts for smokejumpers as a 
"cohesive" crew. 
Conclusion 
This study has used a tension centered approach (Ashcraft & Trethewey. 2004a) 
as a lens by which to investigate identity and identification within the smokejumper 
organization. This study offers several theoretical and practical implications that are 
worthy of repetition. Theoretically, this study supports and in many ways extends 
previous research dealing with the structurational model of identification and the 
particular outcomes of specific tension and identity management techniques. Importantly, 
it suggests that even the most celebrated management techniques are not beyond re­
examination. In the spirit of Ashcraft & Trethewey 's (2004b) tension-centered approach, 
this study suggests that how researchers define "productive" (p. 178) management 
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techniques must move beyond the scope ol whether such techniques guarantee dav to dav 
harmony. Researchers who examine the worth of management techniques must continue 
to look at ''particular outcomes" (Larson & Pepper. 2003) and consider the larger 
ramifications brought about as management techniques interact with organizational 
identities and the particular binds created as a result of those interactions. 
By way of practical implications, this study suggests that organizations must look 
more closely at the consequences of organizational culture on indi\ idual beha\ ior -
especially if that culture is a "safety'' culture. Creating a professional identity of safety 
may have significant drawbacks for an organization like the U.S. Forest Service. 
Practices like those implemented by the smokejumpers as part of their rookie training 
which reinforce the fallibility of even the most experienced firefighters should continue 
to be promoted within the organization. In addition, the smokejumper organization would 
do well to not only allow, but invite future researchers to study their training methods. In 
terms of crew cohesion, this study also makes an important contribution by arguing for a 
definition of crew cohesion that takes the "special bonds" (Driessen, 2002, p. 14) that bind 
together the smokejumper organization into greater consideration. 
This study began by considering the challenges that might come in being able to 
fight fire aggressively while simultaneously making room for safety. However, as this 
study has shown, while researchers may look at this as a palpable bind, smokejumpers 
employ useful techniques that frame the two seemingly opposing identities as constitutive 
of a much larger whole. The modem smokejumper is a much more complicated creature 
than even this study was able to fully paint a picture of. The contradictions they manage 
on a daily basis attest to the fundamental complexity of everyday life, and overall 
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complexity of the smokejumpers themselves. This study has captured some of comple.\it\ 
that makes up the daily lives of organizational members, and pro\ ides an initial look into 
a very unique organization. However, recognizing the awesome complexity of e\ en day 
life, it makes more sense to look at this study as a faithful profile rather than a complete 
portrait. Like the smokejumpers themselves, the terrain of organizational identity 
continues to prove itself an increasingly complex and challenging en\ ironment for 
organizational communication researchers to navigate and understand. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
10 Standard Fire Orders 11994 version] 
1. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first. 
2. Initiate all action in response to current and expected fire beha\ ior. 
3. Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts. 
4. Ensure that instructions are given and understood. 
5. Obtain current information on fire status. 
6. Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor, and adjoining 
forces. 
7. Determine safety zones and escape routes. 
8. Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations. 
9. Retain control at all times. 
10. Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively. 
(J. N. Maclean, 1999, pp. 237-238) 
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Appendix B 
10 STANDARD FIRE ORDERS [updated] 
The NWCG Parent Group just approved the revision of the Ten Standard Fire Orders in 
accordance with their original arrangement. The original arrangement of the Orders are 
logically organized to be implemented systematically and applied to all fire situations. 
Fire Behavior 
1. Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts. 
2. Know what your fire is doing at all times. 
3. Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire. 
Fireline Safety 
4. Identify escape routes and make them known. 
5. Post lookouts when there is possible danger. 
6. Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively. 
Organizational Control 
7. Maintain prompt communications with your forces, your supervisor and adjoining 
forces. 
8. Give clear instructions and insure they are understood. 
9. Maintain control of your forces at all times. 
If 1-9 are considered, then... 
10. Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first. 
The 10 Standard Fire Orders are firm. We Don't Break Them; We Don't Bend Them. All 
firefighters have a Right to a Safe Assignment. 
(National Interagency Fire Center, 2004) 
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Appendix C 
INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT 
1. What does it mean to be a smokejumper? 
2. Tell me an experience that describes what it means to \ ou to be a smokejumper. 
3. How has the smokejumper organization changed o\ er the last ten years? 
4. How has what it means to be a smokejumper changed o\ er the last ten years? 
5. How do you balance fighting fire aggressix ely w ith providing for safety first? 
a. How do these conflict? 
i. Explain. 
ii. Tell me about a specific instance. 
6. Tell me about an experience you've had on a fire when you felt like your safety 
was at risk. 
a. Who was involved? 
b. What happened? 
7. What do you think about the "can do" culture as a valid representation of the 
smokejumper culture? 
8. How does accountability work as a smokejumper? 
9. How have things changed for you as a smokejumper since South Canyon? 
10. According to current U.S. Forest Service rules, wildland firefighters can disobey a 
safety rule if they feel it would put them in danger. Tell me about an experience 
when you ever disobeyed orders that placed you in an unsafe situation. 
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Appendix D 
Missoula Smokejumper Organization Chart 
FaJl 2004 
R-l 
I Smokejumper 
j Program 
j Manager 
i Operations 
I Foreman 
Fuels/Project 
Foreman 
Loadmasler 
i Foreman 
Fuels/Project 
Assistanl 
Foreman 
Operations 
Assistant 
Foreman 
GS-6 Smokejumpers 
GS-6 Temps 
Parachute Loft 
Foreman 
Training 
Foreman 
Training 
Assistant 
Foreman 
Base' 
Operations 
Manager 
Parachute Loft 
Assistant 
Foreman 
Loadmastcr 
Assistant 
Foreman 
GS-7 Squad Leaders 
Rookies 
10^)  
Appendix E 
Taken from Thackaberry (2005. pp. 4-5). 
SlcmdardFire Fighting Orders (t o. 1957) 
1. FIRE WEATHER. Keep informed of fire w eather conditions and 
predictions. 
2. INSTRUCTIONS. Know exactly what my instructions are and to follow 
them at all times. 
3. RIGHT THINGS FIRST Identify the key points of my assignment and take 
action in order of priority. 
4. ESCAPE PLAN. Ha\ e an escape plan in mind and direct subordinates in 
event of blow-up. 
5. SCOUTING. Thoroughly scout the fire areas for which I am responsible. 
6. COMMUNICATION. Establish and maintain regular communication \\ ith 
adjoining forces, subordinates, and superior officers. 
7. ALERTNESS. Quickly recognize changed conditions and immediately 
revise plans to handle. 
8. LOOKOUT. Post a lookout for every possibly dangerous situation. 
9. DISCIPLINE. Establish and maintain control of all men under my 
supervision and at all times know where they are and what they are doing. 
10. SUPERVISION. Be sure men I commit to any fire job have clear 
instructions and adequate overhead. 
Table 1. From USPS, 1957, Appendix 6. 
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Appendix F 
INSTITUTIONAL RE\ lEW BOARD CONSENT FORM 
Please read this form and ask any questions you may ha\ e before vou agree to be 
in this study. This study is being conducted by Cade Spaulding as the basis for his 
master s thesis, chaired by Dr. Gregory Larson of the Department of Communication 
Studies at the University of Montana. 
Background Information: 
You are invited to participate in a research study dealing with smokejumper 
culture and decision making. I am interested in the \ alues that make up what it means to 
be a smokejumper today and how that compares to \\ hat it meant to be a smokejumper 
before South Canyon. I'm also interested in how smokejumpers manage tensions between 
getting the job done and following safety rules and how this affects the decisions they 
make on the job. 
This study is important. Many of the seasoned veterans in the field of wildland 
firefighting are coming to the age of retirement. As a result, \\ ildland firefighting stands 
to lose many of its most experienced practitioners. These individuals have learned 
important lessons about how to productively manage the tension between safety and 
getting the job done that need to be recorded and passed on before they are lost. This 
study will record these lessons and look for patterns that contribute to productive 
firefighting as evaluated by the smokejumpers themselves. It will also help the industry 
gauge how smokejumpers and the smokejumper organization has changed since South 
Canyon in 1994 when increased safety initiatives were established. 
Procedure: 
You were selected as a possible participant in this research because you have 
experience as a smokejumper at the Missoula base. If you agree to be in this study, you 
will be interviewed and asked several questions which will be audio taped and then 
transcribed into text form. The interview will cover topics related to what it means to be a 
smokejumper today and what it meant to be one before South Canyon, and experiences 
where you had to manage tension between safety and getting the job done. 
Interviews will be held at the Missoula Smokejumper Base. Ed Ward, the base 
manager, has given his support of this project and Tim Eldridge will make all further 
contact with you. After the study is complete, only the general findings of the study will 
be presented to the base manager. All personal mformation that may identify you, 
including your name, the date of the interaction, and the names of other participants 
mentioned will be omitted from the general findings. In other words, those that read the 
final report will not be able to identify specific participants with the information reported 
in the findings of this study. Your personal information will remain confidential and 
secure. 
Potential Benefits: 
You will receive no direct compensation either financial or otherwise for 
participating in this study. However, in the long run this study may impro\e wildland 
firefighter safety by helping firefighters better understand the things that impact the 
decisions they make. It may also improve safct\ in the long run b\ recording producti\ c 
decision making patterns and by pointing out less productive patterns that could be 
avoided. 
Potential Risks: 
There are two potential risks for those participating in this study. First, this study 
will require a time commitment that takes you awa> from your normal \\ ork acti\ ities. 
You will be asked for 30 — 45 minutes of your work time for interviewing purposes with 
the possibility of additional interviews at your discretion and the discretion of the 
researcher. Second, in the process of these interv iew s you may experience difficult 
memories and strong emotions such as anger, fmstration, sadness, etc. Should you 
experience any emotional discomfort you can recei\ e help by contacting the Region 1 
Employee Assistance Program Coordinator, Sandra Abbott, who is available 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year at; 
Sandra Abbott (Region 1 EAP Coordinator) 
(406) 329-3506 (voice) 
(406) 329-3124 (fax) 
sabbott(^fs.fed.us 
Voluntary Participation and Rights: 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and will have no 
impact on your rights as an employee or the conditions of your employment. You 
have the right to stop the interview at any time and withdraw from the study completely. 
You have the right to skip over any question for any reason (or for no reason) and answer 
only the questions you feel comfortable answering. You have the right to strike any 
previous responses from the record at any time during the interview or after the interview 
is complete. Your participation has neither a positive or negative impact on your 
relationship with the University of Montana. 
Confidentiality: 
This study will protect your confidentiality. Each interview will be tape recorded. 
However, audio tapes will only be used in order to ensure the accuracy of the information 
and will be transcribed into text form. The audio tapes and transcriptions will be stored 
under lock and key at a safe location. Original names will be omitted from the 
transcriptions and your confidentiality will be protected. Only my thesis chair and I will 
have access to the audio tapes, transcriptions, and interview notes. Once I am finished 
with the information, I will destroy the audio tapes. 
All data collected as part of this project are the property of the rcsearchcr The 
Missoula Smokejumper Base and the participants of this study w ill onlx ha\ c access to 
the general findings of this study. They will not ha\e access to audio tapes of inter\ iew s, 
transcribed interviews, and/or hand notes taken during the interv iew. 
Questions: 
You will receive a copy of this signed form to keep for vour records. 1 \\ ill keep 
the other copy for my records. For any further questions regarding this stud\ . please 
contact: 
Cade Spaulding (Graduate Researcher) 
(406) 243-6604 (office) 
cadc.spauldinu^g- iii'nontana.edu 
Department of Communication Studies 
University of Montana 
Missoula, MT 59812 
Gregory Larson, Ph.D. (Thesis Chair) 
(406) 243-4161 (office) 
ercu. 1 arsonfc/ insOAimi cdu 
Department of Communication Studies 
University of Montana 
Missoula, MT 59812 
Note; In the event that you are injured as a result of this research you should individually 
seek appropriate medical treatment. If the injury is caused by the negligence of the 
University or any of its employees, you may be entitled to reimbursement or 
compensation pursuant to the Comprehensive State Insurance Plan established by the 
Department of Administration under the authority of M.C.A., Title 2, Chapter 9. In the 
event of a claim for such injury, further information may be obtained from the 
University's Claims representative or University Legal Counsel. (Reviewed by 
University Legal Counsel. July 6, 1993). 
Statement of Consent; 
I have read the above information. 1 have asked questions and have received answers. I 
consent to participate in this study. 
Signature Date 
Signature of Investigator Date 
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